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PREFACE 
This study investigated the impact of the severity (low 
versus high) and nature of a defendant's prior criminal record 
(crime against property versus crime against person) on jury 
verdicts and deliberation time.. A 2 X 2 completely randomized 
factorial experimental design was used. In addition, the 
jurors' manner of integrating trial evidence and information 
was explored by obtaining their responses on several question-
naires which were administered following jury deliberations. 
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The word ",jury" is defined as a "body of laymen 
selected by lot, or by some other fair and impartial means, 
to ascertain, under the guidance of a judge, the truth in 
questions of fact arising either in a civil or criminal 
proceeding" (Gulick & Kimbrough, 1965, p. 626). When a 
person has been charged with a crime, he is guaranteed cer-
tain rights, among them the right to a trial by an impartial 
jury and the right against self-incrimination. In order to 
prevent the jury's receiving biasing information, federal 
rules of evidence state that a prosecutor cannot use infor-
mation about a defendant's "bad character" as evidence in 
the trial--the trial evidence must be limited to actual 
occurrences which bear directly on the facts of the criminal 
act before the court (Brooks & Doob, 1975). 
In cases where the crime of which the defendant is 
accused constitutes a second or subsequent felony offense, 
or in cases where the death penalty is a possibility, federal 
rules of evidence specify that the trial is to be "bifur-
cated," consisting of two stages. During the first stage of 
a bifurcated trial procedure, evidence regardi~g the crime 
itself is presented. After this initial stage, the jury 
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decides the guilt or innocence of the defendant. If they 
find the defendant not guilty, the trial is over; if, 
however, the jury returns a verdict of guilty, information 
regarding the defendant's prior criminal record (previous 
convictions of felonies and crimes of "moral turpitude") is 
introduced during the second stage. The bifurcated trial 
enables the jury to consider the defendant's prior criminal 
record in recommending punishment. In this manner, "habitual 
offenders" can be dealt with more harshly (Oklahoma Statutes 
1971, and 1977 Amendment, Title 22, Section 860). Further, 
during this stage of the proceeding, attorneys can introduce 
evidence of a mitigating or aggravating nature in order to 
influence the setting of punishment (Note 1). Thus, the 
rules of evidence for the two stages are substantially dif-
ferent. The Supreme Court has noted that making a distinc-
tion between the evidenciary rules governing trial and those 
governing sentencing is sounds 
The trial is limited narrowly to strictly relevant 
evidence, to avoid waste of time and confusion, and 
to prevent influencing the court by evidence of 
other misconduct. But a sentencing judge is not 
limited to the issue of guilt, his task being to 
decide upon a type of punishment within the statu-
tory limits. It is both relevant and essential 
for the judge to have in his possession the fullest 
possible information (Fellman, 1958, P• 45). 
In Oklahoma the jury recommends sentence. The court is 
bound by law to follow the jury's recommendation except when 
the jury cannot reach unanimous agreement or when the 
punishment decided upon is excessive (greater than the maxi-
mum fixed by law). When the exceptions occur, the ju~ge 
sets sentences (Oklahoma Statutes 1971, Title 22, Sections 
926-928). In addition, the judge may rule suspension or 
probation of all or any part of the sentence (Oklahoma 
Statutes 1971, Title 22, Section 991). 
J 
The major problem that a defendant encounters during a 
bifurcated trial becomes apparent when he has a prior crimi-
nal record and his defense demands that he testify in his 
own behalf. When the defendant takes the witness stand, the 
prosecutor can, in cross-examination during the first stage 
of the bifurcated trial, question the defendant regarding his 
prior criminal record for the purpose 0£ affecting his credi-
bility as a witness (Oklahoma Statutes 1971, and 1977 Amend-
ment, Title 22, Section 860). Questions about the prior 
record of the defendant can also be introduced in order to 
establish identification of the defendant (Note 2). 
This situation places the defendant in a serious 
dilemma. The reason for providing the bifurcated procedure 
is to prevent jury exposure to legally irrelevant informa-
tion, which·expressly includes the defendant's past record. 
Yet if the defendant takes the stand, he cannot refuse to 
answer questions about his prior criminal record. If he does 
not take the stand, the jury will most likely be biased 
against him since it is likely to reason that if he were 
innocent he would assert his innocence under oath (Fellman, 
1958, Chap. 9). 
In addition, the jury empaneled for a bifurcated trial 
is not supposed to know that their trial is a bifurcated 
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procedure because they may thereby suspect that a past 
criminal record is involved. Any citizen who has served o.n 
a jury previously, however, is likely to be aware of trial 
bifurcation, and nothing prevents his sharing this infor-
mation with other jurors (Note 1). Because of this problem, 
some legal practitioners believe that all trials should be 
bifurcated (Notes 1 & 2). 
In summary, the legal rationale for providing the 
bifurcated trial is that information about the defendant's 
prior criminal record is irrelevant during the verdict 
phase, but is necessary during sentencing. Knowledge of a 
defendant's past is thought to unduly influence the verdict 
behavior of .the jury, thereby preventing the jury from being 
wholly objective in its consideration of the trial evidence. 
Presence of the prior record has been explored pre-
viously by Bedriek (1980), who noted that further work 
varying characteristics of the prior record is needed. 
Similarity between present crime and prior record has been 
investigated (McCabe, 19741 Sealy & Cornish, 197.}a) and has 
indicated that when the crimes are similar, jurors are more 
likely to convict. As a logical next step, the purpose of 
the present study is to examine the effects of varying 
severity and nature of the prior conviction upon jury 
behavior. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Jury Literature 
Methodology 
A real jury cannot be observed while they are deliber-
a tingi deliberations are held in secret, and may not be 
observed, recorded, or filmed. Two basic methodologies have 
been utilized by social psychologists in their attempt to 
study the group processes of juries. In the more common 
design, subjects are presented with an account of a crime or 
with trial evidence relating to a crime, deliberate within a 
jury group to reach a verdict, and perhaps complete some 
rating scales or other instruments of interest. In this 
design, the jury deliberations are observed and analyzed, as 
well as their verdict and sentencing behaviors. In all but 
a handful of studies, there is no voir dire at all, and the 
stimulus material is typewritten rather than being live or 
videotaped. A second methodology, used in a few studies and 
therefore minor in comparison with the preceding one, in-
volves interviewing real jurors after their jury service is 
completed. 
Both of these methods have theoretical and/or practical 
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limitations. The first one, which uses mock jurors, has been 
attacked by several authors as lacking validity and general-
izability (Bermant, McGuire, McKinley & Salo, 19741 Davis, 
Bray & Holt, 1977s Feild & Barnett, 1978; Diamond, 1974; 
Diamond & Zeisel, 1974). These criticisms have been substan-
tiated by Wilson and Donnerstein (1977), but Shapley (1974) 
has defended the role of social scientists in jury processes, 
noting that the research has uncovered inequities in the 
American jury system. In addition, the use of college stu-
dents as subjects has been defended by Bray (1978). The 
desirability of using videotaped stimulus material has been 
explored and reported by Bermant, Chappel, Crockett and 
.racoubovitch (1975), Bermant and Jacoubovitch (1975), the 
Brigham Young Law Review (1975), and by Miller (1975). 
The second method mentioned above, that of interviewing 
real jurors after their jury service is completed, is fraught 
with the problems inherent in subjective descriptions and 
evaluations of juries by the participants themselves. 
Effects of Various Types .Q.! Evidence and 
Facts of !h!, Case 
Many factors thought to influence juror behavior have 
been investigated. In general, perceptions of a crime as 
serious or heinous results in more attribution of responsi--
bility and harsher sentencing (Hendrick & Shaffer, 1975b; 
Hester & Smith, 19731 Mccomas & Noll, 19741 Phares & Wilson, 
1972). Apparently, a fairly stable hierarchy of the 
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seriousness of crimes exists in the minds of most individuals 
(Carroll & Payne, 19771 Rose & Prell, 1955). 
Prior record of the defendant has been explored to some 
extents its proper use during the trial is discussed by 
Brooks and Doob (1975) and by Margolis (1974). Two studies 
have found that, when the prior record is similar to the 
present offense, jurors are more likely to convict, but when 
it is dissimilar, they are more likely to acquit (McCabe, 
1974s Sealy & Comish, 1973a). 
Studies which have considered the effect of victim 
injury on sentencing have resulted in contradictory data. 
Scroggs (1976) reported that severity of sentencing increased 
with degree of harm to the victim, but other studies have 
found no effect (Boor, 19761 Davis, 1977). In addition, Boor 
(1975) found that varying the competence of the victim and 
emphasizing the defendant's opportunism had no effect on 
sentence severity. 
In exploring the effect of defendant remorse on sentenc-
ing, Jacobson and Berger (1974) and Rumsey (1976) reported 
that jurors sentenced much more leniently when the defendant's 
repentance was obvious. Further, when jurors were told that 
the defendant's accomplice had escaped, they sentenced more 
leniently than when they believed that both the defendant and 
the accomplice had been captured (DeJong & Hogue, 19781 
DeJong, Morris & Hastorf, 1976). Frankel and Morris (1976) 
report a boomerang effect which occurs when defendants testi-
fy as to extenuating circumstances surrounding the criminal 
act, resulting in harsher judgments after such testimony. 
Defendants who plead the Fifth Amendment are judged more 
guilty (Hendrick & Shaffer, 1975a), as are those who with-
hold evidence or are perceived as intending to withhold 
evidence (Shaffer, Sadowski & Hendrick, 1978). 
8 
The effect of inadmissible evidence has also been 
investigated. Sue, Smith, and Caldwell (1973) found that 
inadmissible evidence influenced verdicts when the remaining 
evidence was weak, but not when it was strong. Wolf and 
Montgomery (1977) reported that critical testimony had no 
effect on verdict when it was simply ruled inadmissible, but 
when ruled inadmissible followed by a strong judicial admon-
ishment to disregard it, verdicts were influenced in the 
direction of that testimony. This finding was interpreted in 
terms of Brehm's theory of psychological reactance. 
In other work, research data indicate that the number 
and kind of decision alternatives affect juror verdict be-
havior (Larntz, 1975• Roberts, Hoffman & Johnson, 1978s 
Vidmar, 1972). When jurors are given a choice between guilty 
of first degree murder and not guilty, for example, they are 
much more likely to acquit than if their choice .. is between 
first degree murder, manslaughter, and not guilty. Finally, 
Calder, Insko, and Yandell (1974) concluded that the process 
of persuasion in a jury trial is cognitive in nature, and 
that therefore jurors come to their decisions via a 
rational, rather than emotional, process. 
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Group Processes 
Weld and Danzig (1940) concluded that the juror reaches 
a decision before going into the deliberation room, and that 
jurors who do not agree with him are not able to change his 
decision. In contrast, after studying the group processes of 
juries, Foss (1976) concluded that simulated juries reach a 
final decision by an equalitarian process in which individual 
points of view are fairly represented. Foss suggested that 
the various extralegal factors which have been identified as 
influencing decision-making in individual jurors may be less 
important f'or group judgments t·han might be assumed from 
studies of individual jurors. This conclusion is supported 
by several studies which have found that group discussion 
tends to influence individual verdict and sentencing behavior 
(Da'rls, Stasser, Spitzer & Holt, 1976s Myers&: Kaplan, 1976), 
leading to a leniency shift in some cases (Gleason &: Harris, 
1976; Izzett &: Leginski, 1974s Roberts et al., 19781 Rumsey, 
1976s Rumsey, Allgeier & Castore, 1978; Rumsey & Rumsey, 
1977) and to changing perceptions of the defendant's potency 
and goodness (Simon, 1968). Further, Hadden (1973) believes 
that the jury constructs reality by integrating parts of the 
trial evidence presented by both sides and selected to form a 
sensible view of the defendant in relationship to the 
accusation. 
Participation in jury deliberation varies with social 
status of' the juror, higher status jurors having higher rates 
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of participation (Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins, 1957). In 
addition, Strodtbeck and Hook (1961) found that jurors' posi-
tions at the jury table influence such things a~ participa-
tion and selection of the foreman. Data from two studies 
have indicated that the foreman's prestige and leadership 
style have a great deal of influence in awarding damages in 
civil suits (Beran, Albert, Loiseaux, Mayfield & Wright, 
1958s Eakin, 1975). 
Group deliberation ~s considered in light of various 
decision models by several authors (Penrod & Hastie, 1979r 
Stasser & Davis, 197?; Thomas & Hogue, 1976), and is dis-
cussed in terms of polarization effects by others (Kaplan, 
197?; Kaplan & Miller, 1977s Myers & Kaplan, 1976). 
21!!. !!!, .!h!. Jury fillS Decision Rule. In the past few 
years, much controversy has centered around changing the jury 
system to allow for smaller juries and majority, rather than 
unanimous, decision rules. Some studies have found no dif-
ferences in verdict behavior between 6-person and 12-person 
.iuries (Bermant & Coppock, 19731 Kessler, 197Js Mills, 1973; 
Snortum, Klein & Sherman, 1976), while others have found 
6-person juries to be more likely to convict (B~ckout, Weg, 
Reilly & Frohboese, 1977; Kerr, 1976s Valenti & Downing, 1974; 
Valenti & Downing, 1975). In contrast to these latter 
results, Padawer-Singer, Singer and Singer (1977) found that 
6-person juries were less severe than the larger groups. 
Smaller juries require less time to deliberate (Davis, Kerr, 
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Atkin, Holt & Meek, 19?5) and produce less juror interaction, 
conflict, and satisfaction (Nemeth, 1977). 
Juries with a majority decision rule are more severe 
(Buckout et al., 1977) and take less time to deliberate 
(Davis et al., 1975). Zeisel and Diamond (1974) have pro-
vided a sharp critique of some of the studies done in this 
area, and other authors have discussed mathematical models 
for determining whether or not jury size and decision rule 
should be changed (Friedman, 19721 Saks & Ostrom, 1975). 
Several legal authorities have expressed the desire for 
a constitutional amendment allowing smaller juries (Phillips, 
1956; Siddens, 19741 Tamm, 1962). Others have not proposed 
an amendment, but have advocated the change (Joiner, 1962; 
Toch, 1961; Wiehl, 1968). In addition, several authors have 
urged a statutory change to majority rule rather than the 
requirement of unanimity (Joiner, 19621 Mossman, 19741 Ryan, 
1967). Zeisel (1971) suggested that the issue be carefully 
studied before any changes are madei others have urged that 
no changes be made (Lampert, 1975; University 2! Chicago ~ 
Review, 1954). Finally, Saks (1977) has presented a plan 
which would combine advantages of each of the types of juries 
and decision rules, resulting in what he considers to be the 
best possible system. 
!2!!: Dire. Fellman (1958) defines a jury as an impar-
tial group drawn from a cross-section of the· community. Re-
eeareh indicates, however, that juries are not representative 
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of the whole community (Beiser, 19731 Kairys, 1972; Kairys & 
Schulman, 1975; Rokeach & Vidmar, 197J). Broeder (1965) ob-
served that voir dire is often shallow, brief, and casual, 
and is therefore ineffective as a screening device. Several 
authors discuss the importance to an attorney's case of get• 
ting "good" jurors and about the consequent importance of an 
effective voir dire process (Bush, 1976; Cartwright, 1977r 
Dempsey, 1969; Field, 1965r Harrington & Dempsey, 1969). To 
answer this need for better voir dire, many "how to" strate-
gies have been suggested by legal practitioners (Davis & 
Wiley, 19651 Hare, 1968, Karcher, 1969; Rothblatt, 1966). In 
addition, mathematical models for jury selection have been 
described by Brams and Davis (1976) and Kairys (1972). 
Lowenstein (1977) and Toeh (1961) have suggested that 
potential jurors be given psychological tests to identify and 
reject those individuals whose personal attitudes would bias 
them. Berman and Sales (1977), however, call into question 
the idea of social scientists participating in the jury 
selection process. Lowenstein (1977) believes that making 
jurors aware of extralegal factors that have been found to 
bias juries will increase their impartiality, Balch, 
Griffiths, Hall, and Winfree (1976), however, argue that the 
process of voir dire itself socializes the jurors into their 
new role. 
Judge's Instructions. In recent years, attention has 
increased regarding the effectiveness of judge's instructions 
lJ 
in making juror decision-making more impartial. Dahlberg, 
Lee, and Safford {1976), for example, question the jurors' 
ability to disregard prior record as evidence of guilt when 
instructed to do so by the judge. Indeed, research has 
demonstrated that jurors do not or cannot obey specific judi-
cial admonitions {Harris, 1978s Harris, Teske & Ginns, 1975). 
Despite this evidence, however, Hoffman and Brodley (1952) 
and Lowenstein (1977) recommend that jurors receive more in-
formation in order to enhance their impartiality during 
deliberation. 
When juries are deadlocked, they are often given addi-
tional judge's instructions in order to break the deadlock 
and assure a verdict. One author opposes a judge's interven-
tion under these circumstances because it may place too much 
pressure on the jury, which may result in an unjust verdict 
(~Law Journal, 1968). 
Social Psychological Literature 
In addition to the many topics of research in jury pro-
cesses per !!.• several social psychological theoretical posi-
tions must be considered in order to understand the jury from 
a psychological perspective. Two theoretical orientations 
central to this perspective are cognitive consistency and 
attribution theory as they relate to impression !Drmation. 
The juror's basic duty in a court of criminal law is to lis-
ten to both sides of an issue, integrate the information he 
receives, and arrive at a decision regarding the truth in the 
case. In fulfilling these duties, he is presented with in-
formation about a crime and a defendant and must form an 
opinion regarding the likelihood of the defendant's guilt. 
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Social psychological research has demonstrated that 
people tend to integrate information by a process of weight-
ing and averaging the bits of information they receive. If 
the information they get is inconsistent, the weighting of 
the information in this process changes (Abelson, 1968; 
Anderson, 196.5aa Feldman, 1968). Singer (1968) views infor-
mation integration as a stimulus-processing mechanism which 
tends to, if necessary, distort objectively inconsistent 
material in order to maintain cognitive consistency. This 
distortion can be accomplished in at least three wayss dis-
counting, assimilation, and attention decrement (Anderson & 
Norman, 1964; Jones & Goethals, 1972; Kelley, 1972; Singer, 
1968). These three methods of maintaining cognitive consis-
tency result in either a primacy or a recency effect, depend-
ing upon the method of information presentation. 
When one final evaluative response is required of the 
subject after a set of stimuli is introduced, a primacy 
effect may be expected (Anderson, 1965b; Anderson & Jacobson, 
1965; Asch, 1946). This effect is demonstrated in these sit-
uations because, presumably, the subject receives the first 
parts of the information set and immediately begins making a 
judgment. Once this preliminary judgment (attribution) is 
made, he either assimilates further information into the· 
existing cognitive structure, or discounts it (Warr & Knapper, 
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1968). On the other hand, when evaluative responding is re-
quired after each item, or when pronunciation or repetition 
of the stimuli is required, recency effects emerge (Anderson, 
1965as Stewart, 1965). Hendrick and Costanini (1970) rein-
terpret both primacy and recency effects as resulting from 
attention decrement; all of the methodological procedures 
mentioned above, in effect, redistribute attention across the 
stimuli set, and the results consequently support the atten-
tion decrement interpretation. 
In addition to these ways of conceptualizing the process 
of information integration, two other factors have been iden-
tified which may affect the outcome. Brock and Fromkin (1968) 
found that the subject's "tuning set," or expectations re~rd­
ing the purpose of the information given them, strongly af-
fects how they cognitively select and organize the information. 
Kanouse and Hanson (1972) concluded that people weigh negative 
aspects of an object more heavily than positive ones, being 
generally cost-oriented in forming overall evaluations. 
In the process of attributing causes for another's be-
havior, observers seem to use implicit personality theories--
person, intuitive notions of which traits are likely to go 
together (Cronbach, 1955; Jones, 1954; Mischel, 1969). Ob-
servers often overemphasize the actor's "personality" and use 
their own implicit theories to the detriment of both the 
situational constraints and the stimulus person's unique 
characteristics (Jones & Nisbett, 19721 Mischel, 1968). This 
tendency is both pervasive and consistent, occurring whether 
or not the observer has known the actor previously (Norman, 
1963; Passini & Norman, 1966). 
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Mischel (1968), however, has concluded that generalized, 
specific traits or trait clusters exist only in the mind of 
the observer. Mischel's conclusion is supported by Hartshorne 
and May (1928), who found that the trait of "honestyr" is 
situation-specific, and does not exist as an overall 
characteristic. 
CHAPTER III 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Social Psychology and Jury Processes 
The federal rules of evidence assume that a juror is 
able to follow instructions to disregard specific testimony, 
or to consider testimony to judge a witness's credibility, 
but not as evidence of guilt in the present trial. 
Hartshorne et al. (1928) found that dishonesty in one situa-
tion cannot be used to predict dishonesty in another. It 
seems inaccurate to say, then, that jurors should take evi-
dence of past misbehavior as an indication of dishonesty 
(lying) in the present testimony. Federal rules of evidence 
assume, however, that information of prior conviction is pro-
per in a jury's consideration of credibility, but not as evi-
dence of guilt. Social psychological theory casts doubt on 
the probability of the jurors' ability to do this, indicating 
that jurors integrate information as it comes to them, rather 
than waiting until they have been instructed by the judge as 
to how the information they have received is to be perceived 
or weighted. The primary determinants of information organi-
zation appear to be the constraints of cognitive consistency, 
individual attitudes, and the jurors' implicit personality 
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theories. Jurors screen the information presented them, sel-
ectively organizing it and, if necessary, distorting it to 
maintain consistency. Their own attitudes and implicit per-
sonality theories further influence the integration of the 
information presented. They tend to perceive others in terms 
of stable, general clusters of traits, traits which apparently 
exist only in their own minds. Evidence suggests that jury 
deliberation may "neutralize" some of these effects, but there 
is no evidence that jurors can, in fact, obey judicial admoni-
tions to disregard testimony or to perceive testimony as evi-
dence of credibility but not of guilt. 
In most cases, the defendant must testify in his own 
defense and must not appear to be withholding, or intending 
to withhold, evidence. Since prior record can be introduced 
during his testimony to impeach him as a witness, the jurors' 
ability to separate their consideration of the prior record 
as evidence of credibility and as evidence of guilt is crucial. 
Social psychological theory implies that they cannot make this 
kind of functional distinction. 
If it is assumed, as in the federal rules of evidence, 
that jurors ~ have this ability, and do consider prior con-
viction only in terms of credibility, then prior record should 
have the same effect, whether it be similar or dissimilar to 
the present crime. Yet McCabe (1974) and Sealy et al. (1973a) 
found that when the prior record is similar to the present 
offense jurors are more likely to convicts but when it is 
dissimilar, they react against this knowledge and are more 
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inclined to acquit. 
The Present Research 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of 
two additional facets of prior records the severity of the 
previous crime (high versus low) and its nature (crime against 
property versus crime against person). The effects of these 
variables will be explored using verdict and deliberation time 
as the major dependent variables. 
The methodology for this type of research should be as 
realistic as possible and include voir dire and jury deliber-
ation. The evidence should be ambiguous and should be fol-
lowed by judge's instructions which are actually used in the 
courts. 
Considering social psychological theories as well as 
prior research on juries, several expectations regarding the 
effects of combining these two independent variables are 
apparent. In general, guilty verdicts and length of sentence 
are expected to increase as severity of prior crime increases. 
Prior conviction for a crime against person is expected to 
produce more guilty verdicts and harsher sentences than will 
a crime against property. The combination of high severity 
and crime against person is expected to result in the most 
guilty verdicts, and that of low severity and crime against 
property, in the fewest guilty verdicts. 
The cognitive consistency literature indicates that 
individual jurors who return a guilty verdict will perceive 
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evidence damaging to the defendant's case as most important, 
whereas those who find the defendant not guilty will rate 
non-damaging evidence as most important. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHOD 
The methodology for this study represents a compromise 
between two major considerations in doing social psychologi-
cal researcha mundane realism and experimental cost. Mundane 
realism refers to the use of a methodology which transcends 
the laboratory and enables the researcher to generalize the 
findings to situations actually encountered in the real world. 
A secondary purpose of a methodology characterized by mundane 
realism is to intensify subjects' involvement in the experi-
ment. In this study, subjects participated in a trial proce-
dure identical to the one used in criminal courts. The 
laboratory facility contained a judge's bench, witness chair, 
and a raised, two-tier jury box. In addition, many of the 
materials used during the trial and deliberations were dupli-
cates of printed forms used currently in criminal courts. 
Mundane realism must be weighed against experimental 
cost in terms of time, subject, and form requirements. 
Because of this consideration, two procedures were adopted to 
reduce experimental costs which also reduced mundane realism. 
First, subjects were not in an actual courtroom when they 
observed the videotaped trial. Thus, they knew that they were 
not really deciding the fate of a defendant. The second 
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exception was that 6-person juries instead of the 12-person 
juries normally used in Oklahoma felony courts were used. 
Subjects 
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The subjects were 180 students solicited from undergrad-
uate psychology classes at Oklahoma State University. Each 
subject satisfied two legal criteria in order to se·rve in 
this studyt he or she was eighteen years of age or older 
with no prior felony convictions. These criteria. were appro-
priate since they satisfied the legal requirements for a 
citizen to serve as an actual juror in a civil or criminal 
case in Oklahoma. Subjects were recruited in groups of 18 
for each of 10 experimental sessions. Subjects were randomly 
and equally assigned to the five experimental conditions. 
Experimental Design 
A 2 X 2 completely randomized factorial design repre-
senting the severity of the crime involved in the defendant's 
prior conviction (high versus low) and the nature of the crime 
involved in the prior conviction (crime against property 
versus crime against person) was used. All treatments were 
fixed. In addition, a control group was included, in which no 
prior record was introduced. 
The dependent variables included jury verdict (guilty, 
not guilty), recommended length of sentence, and length of 
deliberation. The deliberation times required to reach a 
verdict and to assign a sentence (if the verdict was guilty) 
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were recorded separately. The deliberation time in each eon-
di tion was measured from the time the deliberation room door 
was closed until deliberations ceased. Further, each delib-
eration was tape recorded to assure accurate assessment of 
deliberation time, a procedure which was especially important 
since the deliberations for verdict and sentencing were unin-
terrupted. In addition, taping the deliberations was planned 
in order to allow for post hoe examination of the decision 
processes of the juries. 
Immediately following jury deliberation, jurors answered 
several questions about their own impressions of the trial 
evidence and jury deliberation, rated items of evidence in 
order of perceived importance, and recalled evidence and in-
formation presented during the trial. The latter two instru-
ments were refined from ones used in previous research 
(Bedrick, 1980). These paper/pencil tasks were included in 




A videotape was made in which the defendant is accused 
of robbery by force, a felony which, in Oklahoma, calls for 
a sentence of 5 to 50 years of incarceration. The evidence 
presented in this tape is based on an actual criminal pro-
ceeding held in Payne County, Oklahoma. in January of 1975 
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(State of Oklahoma versus Salinas and Karlin, No. CRF-74-260). 
The tape presents an ambiguous evidence condition which has 
been used successfully in previous research (Bedrick, 1980). 
The complete script used for the tape is presented in 
Appendix A. 
In addition to the videotape, information about the def-
endant's prior criminal record was prepared for distribution 
at the beginning of the prosecutor's cross-examination of the 
defendant. This practice was adopted in accordance with cur-
rent legal practices; in actual courtroom procedure, when 
jurors are informed of a defendant's prior record, they are 
provided with copies of the judgment certificate for the pre-
vious conviction. In the control condition, jurors received 
no information about prior recordi in the four experimental 
treatment conditions, the judgment certificates reflected 
past convictions for bogus check writing, arson, simple 
assault, and second degree murder. A copy of the "arson" cer-
tificate is included in Appendix B. 
These crimes were independently rated for severity by 27 
undergraduate psychology students before data collection. 
Bogus check writing and simple assault were rated as low in 
severity, whereas arson and second degree murder were per-
ceived as very severe crimes. Using a nine-point bipolar 
scale, with higher numbers indicating increasing severity, 
the mean ratings for these crimes were 4.8, 3.4, 7.4, and 8.7, 
respectively. The t statistic was utilized to verify the 
statistically significant difference between the low- and 
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high-severity ratings. Bogus check writing and arson repre-
sent crimes against property; and simple assault and second 
degree murder, crimes against person. 
Immediately upon completion of the trial, subjects were 
given a short, written summary of the judge's instructions 
(Appendix C), which also included information about sentencing, 
indicating the statutory limits of 5 to 50 years. 
Materials ~ During Deliberation 
The juries required several types of material during 
their deliberation. Ballot slips, pencils, and forms for re-
cording the verdict and sentence were provided. The ballot 
slips were secretly coded so that the voting process could be 
subsequently reconstructed. The design of the verdict and 
sentencing forms approximated, as closely as possible, the 
form used in actual court cases (see Appendix D). 
Post-Deliberation Materials 
Three instruments were used by the jurors after their 
deliberations were completeda a form for rating the impor-
tance of' items of evidence, and questionnaires regarding the 
jurors' impressions of the trial and the deliberation and 
their recall of evidence. These instruments were adminis-
tered in the order outlined. 
Evidence Importance. The evidence importance form, in-
cluded in Appendix E, was composed of a random listing of 
26 
eight major points of evidence included in the videotape, 
plus a ninth item, "defendant's prior criminal record." The 
jurors were required to rate each of the nine items on the 
instrument as to perceived importance, a rating of "l" indi-
cating highest importance and "9," low importance. The evi-
dence importance instrument for the jurors in the control 
group, where no prior record was introduced, included only 
the eight items of evidence. 
General Questionnaire. This questionnaire asked the 
jurors for certain specific information about their juries, 
such as the number of males and females included, and the 
initial split of guilty-not guilty votes. In addition, 
several questions were included which involved their opinions 
and impressions of the evidence presented in the trial. 
These questions were presented to the jurors in the form of 
nine-point bipolar scales, in which a higher number indicated 
increasing value of a dimension (certainty, relevance, etc., 
see Appendix F). Among these questions, numbers 9 and 10 
were critical items1 both elicited perceptions of the manner 
in which the defendant's prior record was used in the deli-
beration process. 
Evidence Recall. The evidence recall instrument was 
composed of 35 true-false items designed to measure jurors' 
ability to remember details of evidence presented in the 
trial as well as events which occurred during the trial. Of 
these 35 items, the correct answer to 10 indicate the 
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defendant's guilts the correct answer to 10 indicate his inno-
cences and the remaining 15 are neutral, indicating neither 
guilt nor innocence. 
In each of the 10-item groups, five questions are true 
and five, false. 
eight are false. 
Of the 15 neutral items, seven are true and 
This questionnaire is included in Appendix 
G. The correct answer to each question is underlined, and 
each item is labeled as to whether it indicates guilt, no 
guilt, or neutrality. Scoring represents a simple count of 
the number of questions answered correctly. The "verdict 
relevant" score was computed by adding together the number of 
"guilty" items and "not guilty" items which were answered 
correctly. 
Procedure 
Three six-person juries were formed for each experimental 
session. Upon arrival, subjects were assigned randomly to the 
three juries by having each subject draw one poker chip from a 
paper bag. The bag contained six each of red, blue, and white 
chips (for the three juries), plus enough yellow chips (for 
alternates) to complete the number of subjects who had re-
ported for the experimental session. This procedure was 
followed by a verbal orientation to jury service. 
A short voir dire was then conducted to increase mun-
dane realism and to enhance the subjects' involvement in the 
study. During this voir dire, each juror described himself/-
herself by giving his/her name, place of residence, and 
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college major. The jurors were asked several general ques-
tions, and then more specific questions, by the experimenter, 
who took the role of an Officer of the Court. The "script" 
for these verbal procedures is presented in Appendix H. 
Following the voir dire, the experimental juries viewed 
the trial and received the information about the prior record 
at the appropriate time. The verbal instructions which the 
jurors received at this point are in Appendix H. After 
viewing the trial, they received a written summary of the 
judge's instructions which included information about senten-
cing (Appendix C}. Finally, they received additional verbal 
instructions (Appendix H}. 
Each jury then retired to a deliberation room in order 
to reach a verdict and, in the case of a guilty verdict, to 
recommend punishment. Once the verdict and sentencing were 
completed, all materials used during deliberation (verdict/-
sentencing forms, ballot slips, judgment certificates, and 
summary sheets} were removed, and the three paper/pencil 
tasks were administered. After completing these tasks, they 
were debriefed, received credit for their participation in 
the experiment, and were dismissed. The time required for 
each experimental session was approximately two hours. 
Since 24 (rather than the minimum 18) students were 
recruited for each experimental session, more than 18 stu-
dents appeared for some of the sessions. These additional 
students were used as a separate control. Acting as jury 
alternates, they were exposed to the same experimental 
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conditions as the juries but reached their verdicts, recom-
mended sentence, and completed the additional paper/pencil 
tasks individually. This control was planned so that the 
behavior of the jury groups could be compared with that of 
individuals on a post hg£ basis, to assess the influences of 
group discussion and group processes on information integra-
tion and decision-making. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
This study manipulated two independent variables, both 
of which represent characteristics of the prior record of 
the defendant implicated in the videotaped trial. Severity 
of the prior record (low, high) and nature of the prior 
record (crime against property, crime against person) were 
varied in a 2 X 2 completely randomized factorial design. In 
addition, a control condition was planned, in which no prior 
record was included. A detailed presentation of information 
about the juries involved in the study is included in Appen-
dix I. Analyses of variance were used to determine the 
effects of the treatments on juries' verdicts, sentences, and 
deliberation times. 
In addition to these analyses of jury behavior, several 
juror behaviors were examined using analyses of variance and 
correlation procedures. Analyses of variance assessed the 
effects of the independent variables upon jurors' reactions 
to the t~ial and deliberation, their ability to recall infor-
mation about the trial, and their importance ratings of nine 
items of evidence/information presented during the trial. 
Correlation coefficients were used to identify interrelation-
ships among these three sets of dependent variables. All 
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reported correlations are statistically significant at the 
.05 level or less; no non-significant correlations are re-
ported. Jury and juror analyses are reported separately, as 
are the results for the control group and the alternates. 
Several juror substitutions occurred as a result of 
challenges for cause during the voir dire. These substitu-
tions served to increase mundane realism and external valid-
ity. A total of three females and two males were pre-empted. 
In each case a same-sexed alternate was substituted, and the 
pre-empted juror joined the panel of alternates. Of the 
total of five pre-empted jurors, three had relatives in law 
enforcement, one had been the victim of a robbery, and one 




All of the juries were required to deliberate until a 
unanimous verdict was reached. A guilty verdict was scored 
"l" and a verdict of not guilty, "O." Two of the juries 
initially reported being unable to reach a unanimous verdict 
("hung"). Both of these juries were split 4-2 (four guilty, 
two not guilty), and both were again. instructed that they 
must reach a unanimous verdict. Jury group nine, which was 
in the low severity, crime against person condition, even-
tually voted guilty, but group 24 (in the high severity, 
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crime against person condition) returned a verdict of not 
guilty. 
In five of the 24 juries, the majority changed their 
opinions to reach a final unanimous verdict. Three of these 
(Juries 1, 2, and 4) were in the low severity, crime against 
property condition; and two (Juries 19 and 24) were in the 
high severity, crime against person condition. All of these 
juries began deliberation with a 4-2 split (four guilty, two 
not guilty), but in all of them the final verdict was not 
guilty. 
Ten of the 24 juries returned a guilty verdict. The 
number of guilty verdicts in each condition is presented in 
Figure 1. Four of these occurred in the low severity treat-
ment condition and six occurred in the high severity condi-
tion. Three guilty verdicts resulted when the prior crime 
was a crime against property, and seven, when it was a crime 
against person. 
Nature 
p t ro-per ;v p erson 
Low 1 3 4 
Severity 
High 2 4 6 
3 7 10 
Figure l. Distribution of Guilty Verdicts 
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A 2 X 2 analysis of variance was performed; the results 
of this analysis are presented in Table I and the means ap-
pear in Table II. None of the main or interaction effects 
was significant, although the effect of nature of the prior 
crime was marginally significant. There was a definite trend 
for prior crimes against person to produce more guilty ver-
dicts,! (1, 20) = 2.67, E. < .11. The means reflecting this 
trend were .25 for the "property" condition and .58 for the 
"person" condition. 
Deliberation Time ~ Sentencing 
The deliberation time for each jury was measured in min-
utes from the beginning of the deliberation until a unanimous 
verdict was reached. Neither of the independent variables, 
nor their interaction, had any significant effect on deliber-
ation time. The overall mean deliberation time was 22.9 min-
utes; the scores ranged from 6 to 89 minutes. 
Likewise, no significant effects resulted from the 
analysis of sentences recommended by the ten juries who re-
turned guilty verdicts. The average sentence assigned was 
13.3 years. Although the effect of severity of the prior 
record was not statistically significant, the sentence 
assigned in the high severity treatment condition was almost 
twice that recommended by jurors in the low severity condi-






ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
OF JURY VERDICTS 




Severity X Nature 1 .ooo 
Error 
* !?. < .12 
20 5.000 
TABLE II 
MEANS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
FOR JURY GROUPS 
J4 
F-Value PR) F 
.67 NS 
2.67 * .oo NS 
Independent Delib. Time N for 
Variable N Ver. Verdict Sent • Sent. 
Overall 24 • 42 22.88 min. 10 lJ.3 yr. 
Severitys 
Low 12 .33 21.17 min. 4 8.8 yr. 
High. 12 • 50 24. 58 min. 6 16.J yr. 
Nature1 
Against Prop. 12 • 25 19. 50 min • J 11.7 yr. 
Against Per. 12 • 58 26. 25 min. ? 14.o yr, 
Severity X Natures 
Low Sev. X Prop. 6 .17 18. 50 min. 1 5.0 yr. 
Low Sev. X Per. 6 • 50 23.83 min • 3 10.0 yr. 
High Sev. X Prop. 6 .33 20. 50 min. 2 15.0 yr. 
High Sev. X Per. 6 .67 28. 6? min. 4 17.0 yr. 
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Juror Behavior 
In addition to the statistical analyses of the juries• 
behavior, dependent variables for the jurors as individuals 
were analyzed. These included their responses on the general 
questionnaire soliciting reactions to the trial and delibera-
tion, their importance ratings for specific items of evidence, 
and their ability to recall information presented during the 
trial. 
Initial verdict and final verdict were recorded as were 
the group verdicts, that is, verdicts of not guilty were 
scored "O" and guilty verdicts, "1." The items on the gener-
al questionnaire were presented in the form of nine-point 
bipolar scales and were scored such that a higher number in-
dicated increasing value of the dimension. In recording 
juror responses on the evidence importance instrument, a 
rating of "l" indicated highest importance and "9," lowest 
importance. Finally, the scoring on the evidence recall in-
strument represented a simple count of the number of true-
false items which were answered correctly, and the "verdict-
relevant" score was computed by adding together the number of 
correct items which indicated the defendant's guilt and those 
indicating his innocence. 
Analyses of variance were performed on these dependent 
variables. In addition to these analyses, correlation coef-
ficients, as previously outlined, were computed. The cor-
relations may be examined in Appendix J. The dependent 
J6 
variables will be presented separately. 
Verdict 
Initial Verdict. The recording of each juror's initial 
verdict was based on self-report and was verified by examin-
ing the ballot slips used by them during their deliberation. 
This dependent variable reflects the way each juror voted on 
the first ballot, and the results are summarized in Table III, 
with means in Table IV. The effects of both severity of the 
prior record and the interaction between the independent var-
iables achieved marginal significance, in both cases, ! (1, 
140) = 2.93, ~~.089. When the prior record reflected a high 
severity crime, jurors were somewhat more likely to vote 
guilty on the first ballot; the means for this relationship 
were .53 for low severity compared with .67 for high severity. 
Turning attention to the interaction, the lowes't mean initial 
verdict occurred in the low severity crime against person 
condition (M = .47), and the highest, in the high severity 
crime against person cell (! = .75). In both of the remaining 
cells, low severity crime against property and low severity 
crime against person, the mean initial verdict was .58. 
Those who voted guilty on the first ballot, in general, 
tended to vote guilty on the final ballot (r=.41), to per-
ceive the prior record as relevant in judging the defendant's 
credibility (r=.19), and to be relatively certain that the 
victim and bartender were not lying and were not mistaken in 
their testimony (r=.26 and .45 for the victims r=.25 and .41 
TABLE III 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR INITIAL 
VERDICTS OF JURORS 
Source D.F. Sum of F-Value 
Squares 
Models 
Severity l .694 
Nature 1 .028 
Severity X Nature l .694 
Error 140 33.222 
* I?. < • 09 
TABLE IV 
MEANS FOR INITIAL VERDICT 
AND VERDICT CHANGE 
Independent Initial 
Variable r! Verdict 
Overall 144 • 597 
Severitys 
Low '72 • 528 
High '72 .667 
Nature a 
Against Property 72 • 583 
Against Person 72 .611 
Severity X Natures 
Low Severity X Property J6 • 583 
Low Severity X Person 36 .472 
High Severity X Property 36 • 583 




















for the bartender). Jurors voting guilty initially also 
perceived the physician's testimony and the bartender's 
testimony as important {r=.16 and .31, respectively). Thus, 
the bartender's testimony was more closely associated with 
guilty verdicts than was the physician's testimony. The 
bartender was perhaps the most damaging witness against the 
defendant, since he was the only "third party" witness to 
testify to the actions of the defendant and the victim on the 
night of the crime. Its strong association with guilty ver-
dicts, therefore, demonstrates consistency. 
Jurors voting not guilty tended to perceive the judge's 
instructions as relevant in their deliberation (r=.19) and 
were relatively certain that the defendant was telling the 
truth in his testimony {r=.42). These jurors perceived 
three items of evidence as most importanta the amount of 
money in the defendant's possession when he was arrested 
(r=.26), the amount of alcohol consumed by both the victim 
and defendant {r=.29), and the absence of stains on the 
defendant's clothes when arrested {r=.46), Finally, those 
jurors voting not guilty on the first ballot tended to score 
higher on the verdict-relevant portion of the evidence recall 
questionnaire (r=.19). 
The positive relationship between initial verdicts of 
not guilty and the importance of the amount of money in the 
possession of the defendant is surprising, since this item of 
evidence is damaging to the defendant's case and, therefore, 
its association with verdicts of not guilty seemingly 
39 
represents an inconsistency. The amount of alcohol consumed 
is relatively ambiguous, and the absence of stains on the 
defendant's clothes when arrested is non-damaging, so the 
association of these two items of evidence with verdicts of 
not guilty is consistent. 
Final Verdict. Those jurors who returned a guilty ver-
dict were more certain of their verdict than were the jurors 
who found the defendant not guilty (r=.Jl). They also tended 
to perceive the defendant's prior record as relevant both in 
their consideration of his credibility as a witness ('r=.41) 
and as evidence of his guilt for the present crime (r=.Jl). 
They saw the prosecutor as more capable (r=,J9) and were more 
certain that the victim and the bartender, both of whom pro-
vided damaging testimony, were neither lying nor mistaken 
(r=.J2 and .45 for the victim; r=.JO and .49 for the barten-
der). Further, they perceived four items of evidence as im-
portant. Two of these involved damaging eyewitness testimony 
by the victim (r=,JO) and the bartender (r=.J8). The other 
two were the physician's testimony (r=.20) and the defen-
dant's lack of corroboration for his version of what happened 
on the night of the crime (r=.26). The positive associations 
between these items of evidence and guilty verdicts is 
reasonable, because they were all damaging except the physi-
eian 's testimony, which was ambiguous. Finally, jurors who 
returned final verdicts of guilty tended to score highest on 
the neutral, or irrelevant, portion of the evidence recall 
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questionnaire (r=.18). 
Jurors who returned verdicts of not guilty perceived 
the defense attorney as more capable (r=.18) and were more 
certain that the defendant was telling the truth when he 
testified (r=.29). Three items of evidence were perceived 
important when verdicts of not guilty were return.eds the 
amount of money the defendant had when arrested (r=.J4), the 
amount of alcohol consumed (r=.41), and the absence of stains 
on the defendant's clothes (r=.66). These are the same three 
items of evidence which were associated with initial verdicts 
of not guilty. Again, the relationship between this verdict 
and the amount of money the defendant had when arrested seems 
inconsistent. 
Verdict Change. This dependent variable reflects 
whether each juror's final verdict was the same as or differ-
ent from his/her initial opinion. Those jurors who had 
changed verdicts were scored "l" for this·variable, and those 
who had not were scored "O." A total of 46 jurors (32%) in 
the 24 juries indicated that they had changed their opinions 
during deliberation. 
Those jurors who changed verdicts were much less certain 
of the final verdict than those who did not change (r=-.44), 
perhaps indicating the effect of peer pressure to conform in 
their decisions to change opinions. They also indicated that 
the judge's instructions were relevant in their deliberation 
(r=.18). Jurors who did not change perceived the prosecutor 
as more capable {r=.20) and scored higher on the neutral 
portion of the evidence recall instrument (r=.20). 
Sentence 
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Two items on the general questionnaire were associated 
with length of sentence recommended by those jurors who re-
turned a guilty verdict. Length of sentence was related to 
the jurors' certainty of the verdict {r=.36) and to their 
certainty that the bartender was telling the truth {r=.27). 
The relationship between certainty of guilt and length of 
sentence demonstrates consistency, which is also demonstra-
ted by the association between length of sentence and the 
testimony of the bartender, which was one of the most dama-
ging items of evidence in the trial. 
General Questionnaire 
Each item on this questionnaire was rated on a nine-
point bipolar scale, where a higher number indicated in-
creasing value on the dimension involved. The means for each 
of the eleven items are presented in Table v. 
Certainty of Final Verdict. Neither the independent 
variables nor their interaction had a significant effect on 
the jurors' certainty of their final verdict, but two of 
these relationships achieved marginal significance (see 
Table VI). Jurors tended to be more certain of the verdict 
when the prior record indicated a previous crime of high 
TABLE V 
MEANS - GENERAL QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS 
Relev PR PR Cap Cap Cer 
Independent Cer Judge for for of of Def 
Variable n Ver Instr Cred Glt Pros Def Tru 
Overall 144 6.5 6.81 4.26 3. 53 5.14 3.73 J.88 
Severity1 
Low 72 6.19 6.47 3.78 3.38 5.44 3.64 4.17 
High 72 6.81 7.14 4.75 3.69 5.58 3.82 J.58 
Nature a 
Property 72 6.39 6.74 J.75 2.82 5.07 3.82 J.88 
Person 72 6.61 6.88 4.77 4.25 5.96 3.64 J.88 
Sev. X Natures 
Lo X Prop. J6 5.78 5.81 3.19 J.06 4.69 J.50 4.oo 
Hi X Prop. J6 6.61 7.14 4.J6 J.69 6.19 J.78 4.33 
Lo X Per. 36 7.00 7.67 4.JO 2.58 5.44 4.14 3.75 












































ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
CERTAINTY OF VERDICT 




Severity X Nature 1 lJ.44 
Error 140 689.33 
* 12. < .10 
4J 
F-Value PR> F 
2.73 * .36 NS 
2.73 * 
severity, ! (1, 140) = 2.73, £( .10. The means reflecting 
this relationship were 6.19 for low severity compared with 
6.81 for high severity. The Severity X Nature interaction 
was also marginally significant, F (1, 140) = 2.73, £< .10. 
Jurors were least certain of their verdicts when in the low 
severity crime against property treatment condition (M = 
5.8), and were most certain in the low severity crime against 
person condition (M = 7.0). Means in the remaining two cells 
were 6.61. 
Certainty of verdict was significantly correlated with 
six other items on the general questionnaire. Jurors who 
were certain of their verdicts were also certain of the vera-
city of the testimony presented by the crucial witnesses in 
the trial. They indicated that they felt certain the defen-
dant was telling the truth (r=.20), the victim was not deli-
berately lying (r=.27) and was not mistaken (r=.2J), and the 
bartender was not deliberately lying and was not mistaken 
(r=.24 and .22, respectively). In addition, they perceived 
the prosecutor as being capable {r=.28). None of the evi-
dence importance items were correlated significantly with 
certainty of verdict. Accuracy on the guilt-indicating items 
of the evidence recall instrument, however, was negatively 
related to certainty (r=-.17). Jurors who indicated that 
they were certain of their verdict scored lower on this por-
tion of the true-false test. 
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Relevance .2! Judge's Instructions During Deliberation. 
The relationship between severity of the prior record and 
jurors' report of the importance of judge's instructions 
during deliberation was significant; jurors in the high 
severity condition rated judge's instructions as more rele-
vant,! (1, 140) = 4.08, ~ (.045 (Ms= 6.47 for low severity 
and 7.14 for high severity). Further, the interaction 
between the two independent variables had a highly signif i-
cant effect on their ratings, F (1, 140) = lJ.11, ~< ,0004. 
These data are presented in Table VII. Jurors in the high 
severity crime against property experimental condition rated 
the judge's instructions as most relevant (M = 7.67); those 
in the low severity crime against property condition rated 
the instructions as least relevant (M = 5.81). 
Relevance of instruction was not significantly correla-
ted with any other item on the general questionnaire, but it 
was negatively related to importance of the physician's test-
imony (r=-.23). Those who perceived the instruction as rele-
vant tended to assign little importance to the testimony of 
the physician, who testified only as to the injuries of the 
victim, but did not present evidence either favoring or 
damaging the defendant's case. 
Relevance .Q! Prior Record in Judging Defendant's Credi-
bility. This question was one of the most critical items on 
the general questionnaire, since it bears directly on the 






ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
RELEVANCE OF JUDGE'S 
INSTRUCTIONS 







Severity X Nature l 51.36 13.11 
Error 
* E < • 05 







ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR RELEVANCE 
OF PRIOR RECORD IN JUDGING 
DEFENDANT"S CREDIBILITY 
D. F. Sum of F-Value 
Squares 
1 34.03 6.39 
1 )8.03 7.14 
Severity X Nature 1 • 69 .13 
Error 140 745.22 
* E <. 02 









the analysis of variance results for this dependent variable. 
Both of the independent variables had a highly significant 
effect on jurors' responses to this question. They apparent-
ly gave much more weight to the prior record when it reflect-
ed a high severity crime, E (1, 140) = 6.39, ~ <.013, or when 
the previous crime was against a person, F (1, 140) = 7.14, 
~ < .008. The means reflecting these relationships were 3.78 
for low severity versus 4.75 for high severity, and 3.75 for 
crime against property compared with 4.77 for crime against 
person. 
This variable was also significantly correlated with 
several other dependent variables. First, there was a highly 
significant relationship between jurors' use of prior record 
in judging the defendant's credibility and their use of it as 
evidence for guilt in the present trial (r=.56). This rela-
tionship may indicate that, contrary to legal assumptions, 
jurors are not able to distinguish cognitively between these 
two ways of considering the prior record. Jurors who indi-
cated that they used the prior record in judging the defen-
dant's credibility tended also to be relatively certain that 
the victim was not deliberately lying (r=.21) and that he was 
not mistaken in his testimony (r=.39). An even greater rela-
tionship occurred when they rated their certainty that the 
bartender was telling the truth (r=.36) and that he was not 
mistaken (r=.48). Not surprisingly, those jurors who rated 
the defendant's prior record as important in their consider-
ation of his credibility also doubted the veracity of his 
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testimony (r=-.16). 
High ratings on this question were correlated signifi-
cantly with high importance ratings on four items of evidences 
the victim's eyewitness identification of the defendant as 
his assailant (r=.19), the bartender's eyewitness testimony 
(r=.26), the defendant's lack of corroboration for his own 
testimony (r=.17), and the defendant's prior record (r=.47). 
All of these are damaging to the defendant's case, so their 
statistical association with the' use of his prior record to 
determine credibility is reasonable. This consistency is 
also demonstrated, with one exception, by the negative rela-
tionships between jurors' use of the prior record to judge 
credibility and four additional items of evidences the amount 
of alcohol consumed by the defendant and the victim on the 
night of the crime (r=-.23), the absence of stains on the de-
fendant's clothes when arrested (r=-.47), the defendant's 
account of his own activities on the evening of the robbery 
(r=-.18), and the amount of money in his possession when he 
was arrested (r=-.17). The first of these items is ambi-
guous, and the second and third are non-damaging to the de-
fendant's easer thus, their negative relationships with 
relevance of prior record in determining credibility is un-
derstandable. The fourth item, however, is damaging, so its 
inclusion in this group appears inconsistent. 
Relevance ![!. Prior Record !.§.Evidence ![!_ Guilt in !h!. 
Present Case. This question was a second critical item 
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included in the general questionnaire. Severity of the pre-
vious crime had no significant effect, but the nature of the 
crime and the Severity X Nature interaction were highly sig-
nificant (see Table IX). When the prior record reflected a 
crime against person, jurors were much more likely to use 
that prior record as evidence of guilt in the present trial, 
! (1, 140) = 17.14, ~(.0001. Means demonstrating this 
relationship were 2.82 for the crime against property condi-
tion compared with 4.25 for the crime against person condi-
tion. Further, jurors in the high severity cells were the 
most disparate in their responses to this question, F (1, 140) 
= 5,25, ~<.025, the lowest cell mean occurring in the high 
severity crime against property condition (M = 2.58), and the 
highest occurring in the high severity crime against person 
cell (M = 4.81). 
Juror ratings of the relevance of prior record as evi-
dence of guilt correlated significantly with several other 
variables. Jurors who indicated that the prior record was 
relevant as evidence of guilt also indicated that they were 
certain that neither the victim nor the bartender were mis-
taken in their testimony during the trial (r=.25 and .31, 
respectively). These relationships demonstrate consistency, 
as do those between relevance of prior record as evidence of 
guilt and the importance of six items of evidence. Jurors 
who indicated that the prior record was relevant as evidence 
of guilt also tended to place high importance on four dama-
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of the defendant when arrested (r=.17), the victim's identi-
fication of the defendant as his assailant (r=.25), the bar-
tender's testimony (r=.17), and the defendant's prior record 
itself (r=.4?). In addition, two non-damaging items were 
negatively relateds the absence of stains on the defendant's 
clothes when arrested (r=-.34) and the amount of alcohol con-
sumed (r=-.24). As stated previously, these correlations are 
aligned properly, given the nature of each variable. 
Capability .Q.f !h!. Prosecutor. Juror ratings of the 
effectiveness of the prosecuting attorney were affected sig-
nificantly by the nature of the crime relected by the prior 
record, ! (1, 140) = 5.69, E. < .02, see Table x. Their 
ratings were higher when the previous crime was against a 
person rather than against property (Ms = 5.96 and 5.07, 
respectively). There was also a tendency for jurors to be 
most disparate in their ratings when they were in the low 
severity cells, F (1, 140) = 2.69, :e,(.10. Means reflecting 
this interaction were 6.19 in the low severity crime against 
property treatment condition, compared with 5.44 in the low 
severity crime against person condition. The remaining cell 
means, both in the high severity condition, were between 
these two extremes. 
Those jurors who perceived the prosecutor as being 
effec"ttive also tended to believe that the victim was neither 
lying nor mistaken (r=.36 and .26, respectively), and that 
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respectively). Further, they tended to consider two damaging 
items of evidence as importants the defendant's lack of cor-
roboration for his own testimony (r=.18) and the bartender's 
testimony (r=.24). In addition, capability of the prosecutor 
was negatively related to jurors' importance ratings of the 
absence of stains on the defendant's clothes when arrested 
(r=-.J2). - Since this latter item is non-damaging to the de-
fendant's case, these relationships seem aligned consistently. 
Capability of the Defense Attorney. Neither of the in-
dependent variables, nor their interaction, had significant 
effect on this dependent variable. Juror ratings of the de-
fense attorney's effectiveness were correlated significantly 
with their certainty that the defendant was telling the truth 
in his testimony (r=.28), a relationship which is reasonable. 
In addition, high ratings on this dependent variable were re-
lated to low accuracy scores on the evidence recall questions 
which indicated not guilty (r=-.19), on those which were neu-
tral (r=-.33), and on the instrument as a whole (r=-.28). 
Apparently, those jurors who perceived the defense attorney 
as capable were unable to remember accurately certain infor-
mation about the trial which indicated the defendant's 
innocence. 
Certainty that the Defendant !fil!. Telling 1h!, Truth in 
His Testimony. Overall, jurors did not seem convinced that 
the defendant was telling the truth when he testified during 
the trial; on a nine-point scale, the overall mean response 
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on this item was 3.88. Neither severity nor nature of the 
prior record, nor the interaction, was significant. Juror 
responses on this item, however, were correlated significant-
ly with two other questions on the general questionnaire. 
High certainty of the defendant's veracity was associated 
with low certainty that the victim was not mistaken (r=-.21) 
and with high certainty that the bartender was telling the 
truth (r=.16). The first of these relationships is reason-
able, but the second would seem to show inconsistency. 
This seeming inconsistency may be de-emphasized, how-
ever, in view of the negative relationship between juror cer-
tainty of the defendant's veracity and the perceived 
importance of the bartender's testimony, which was one of the 
more damaging items of evidence contained in the trial 
(r=-.23). There were three other evidence items which were 
negatively correlated with certainty that the defendant was 
telling the truths the victim's identification of the defen-
dant as his assailant (r=-.17), the defendant's lack of 
corroboration (r=-.21), and tha absence of stains on the de-
fendant's clothes when arrested (r=-.37). The first two of 
these are damaging, so their negative association with cer-
tainty of the defendant's veracity is reasonable. The third 
item, however, is non-damaging, a situation which seems to 
indicate inconsistency. 
Two items of evidence were positively related to cer-
tainty that the defendant was telling the truth. One of 
these items, the amount of alcohol consumed (r=.J7), is 
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ambiguous; the other, the defendant's account of his own 
activities (r=.20), is non-damaging. Both of these relation-
ships are therefore reasonable. Finally, jurors who ex-
pressed certainty of the truth of the defendant's testimony 
tended to score lower on the neutral, or irrelevant, portion 
of the evidence recall instrument. 
Certainty ~ the Victim Was Telling the Truth. The 
overall mean on this item was 6.03, indicating that jurors 
tended to believe the victim's testimony. The characteris-
tics of the prior record had no significant effect on their 
responses to this question. These ratings, however, were 
significantly correlated with their certainty that the vic-
tim was not mistaken (r=.42}, and that the bartender was 
neither lying nor mistaken (r=.55 and .46, respectively). 
These relationships demonstrate consistency, as do the 
relationships between certainty of the victim's veracity and 
four items of evidences the victim's identification of the 
defendant as his assailant (r=.JO), the bartender's testimony 
(r=.Jl), the absence of stains on the defendant's clothes 
(r=-.42), and the defendant's account of his own activities 
(r=-.16). The first two of these items were damaging to the 
defendant's case, so their positive relationship with juror 
certainty of the truth of the victim's testimony, which was 
also damaging, is understandable. The same can be said of 
the negative relationships of the latter two items of evi-
dence, which were both non-damaging. 
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Certainty that .!h.!. Victim Was !iQ! Mistaken. Both the 
severity and the nature of the prior record affected juror 
responses to this question; the latter achieved only margi-
nal significance, however (see Table XI). Jurors in the high 
severity condition were much more certain that the victim's 
testimony accurately reflected the true events of the night 
of the crime, F (1, 140) = 12.66, ~(.0005 (Ms= 4.76 and 
6.11 for low and high severity, respectively). Further, they 
tended to be more certain on this item when the prior record 
indicated a crime against person, F 91, 140) = 3.50, ~< .063. 
The latter means were 5.08 for crime against property com-
pared with 5.79 for crime against person. 
Jurors' responses on this item were positively related 
to their certainty that the bartender was telling the truth 
and that he was not mistaken (r=.41 and .65, respectively}. 
Since the bartender's testimony partially corroborated the 
victim's story, this relationship is reasonable. High cer-
tainty of the victim's accuracy was also related to four 
damaging items of evidence listed on the evidence importance 
instrumenta the bartender's testimony (r=.29), the defen-
dant's lack of corroboration (r=.27), the victim's identifi-
cation of the defendant (r=.2lh and the defendant's prior 
record (r=.20). Three other items of evidence were correla-
ted negatively with the jurors' certainty that the victim was 
not mistaken. The first of these, the absence of stains on 
the defendant's clothes (r=-.57), was non-damaging; and the 
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ambiguous. These relationships, therefore, indicate consis-
tency. The third item, the amount of money in the defen-
dant's possession when arrested (r=-.16), was damaging to the 
defendant's case, so this negative relationship seems 
inconsistent. 
Certainty that the Bartender !!!§. Telling 1h! Truth. 
Juror ratings on this question were somewhat affected by the 
nature of the crime indicated by the prior record, l (1, 140) 
= 3.03, ~(.08, see Table XII. They tended to be more cer-
tain that the bartender was not deliberately lying when the 
prior record reflected a crime against person (Ms = 6.04 and 
6.71 for crime against property and person, respectively). 
The highly significant correlation between this depen-
dent variable and the jurors' certainty that the bartender 
was not mistaken (r=.66) is perfectly reasonable, as is its 
positive relationship with three items included on the evi-
dence importance instrument. These three items of evidence, 
all damaging, were the victim's identification of the defen-
dant as the perpetrator of the crime (r=.27), the defendant's 
prior record (r=.16), and the bartender's testimony (r=.J4). 
Conversely, jurors who expressed high certainty of the bar-
tender's veracity tended to place relatively little impor-
tance on three non-damaging evidence itemsa the defendant's 
account of his own actions on the night of the crime (r=-.26), 
the absence of stains on the defendant's clothes when ar-
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defendant and victim on the night of the crime (r=-.27). All 
these relationships, then, demonstrate consistency in the 
j uro.r ratings • 
Certainty !!!!! 1h!! Bartender Was Not Mistaken. Both of 
the independent variables had a significant effect on juror 
responses to this question (see Table XIII). Jurors in the 
high severity treatment condition expressed more confidence 
in the bartender's testimony, l (1, 140) = 3.88, ~<.05, as 
did jurors in the crime against person condition, this latter 
relationship achieving high significance, l (1, 140) = 9.35, 
~(.003. The means reflecting these relationships were 5.14 
versus 5.94 for the "severity" main effect, and 4.92 versus 
6.17 for the "nature" main effect. 
The jurors• expressed confidence in the accuracy of the 
bartender's testimony was correlated significantly with per-
ceived importance of four items of evidence, all of which 
were damaging to the defendant's cases the victim's identi-
fication of the defendant (r=.J2), the defendant's lack of 
corroboration (r=.2J), the defendant's prior criminal record 
(r=.21), and the bartender's testimony itself (r=.29). 
Likewise, their certainty was negatively related to four 
items of evidences the amount of alcohol consumed by the 
victim and defendant (r=-.J2), the absence of stains on the 
defendant's clothes when arrested (r=-.58), the defendant's 
account of his own actions on the night of the crime (r=-.16), 
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arrested (r=-.19). The first of these is ambiguous, the 
second and third, non-damaging. Their negative relationship 
with confidence in the bartender's testimony is, therefore, 
reasonable. The fourth item of evidence, however, is dama-
ging; its negative association with this dependent variable 
appears inconsistent. 
Summary. Overall, the analyses of variance reported 
here indicate that the severity and nature of the prior re-
cord have rather generalized effects. The severity of the 
prior record was found to significantly affect relevance of 
the judge's instructions during deliberation and certainty 
that neither the victim nor the bartender was mistaken in his 
testimony, as well as the relevance of the prior record in 
determining the defendant's credibility as a witness. Nature 
of the previous crime affected, not only the relevance of the 
prior record in considering the defendant's credibility, but 
also the use of the prior record as evidence of guilt for 
the present crime, the capability of the prosecutor, and con-
fidence in the victim's testimony. Further, these two inde-
pendent variables interacted significantly to affect the 
relevance of the judge's instructions and the use of prior 
record as evidence of guilt for the present crime. 
Generally, the items on this questionnaire were related 
to one another and to the items of evidence in a consistent 
manner. Items which reflected damaging evidence or informa-
tion were, in most cases, positively correlated with each 
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other and negatively related to non-damaging items. The one 
exception was that the amount of money found on the defendant 
when arrested, which is a damaging item of evidence, was in 
three cases negatively related to items on the general ques-
tionnaire which were of a damaging nature. The direction of 
these relationships seems to indicate logical inconsistency. 
Evidence Importance Instrument 
This form consisted of a random listing of eight items 
of evidence presented during the trial, plus a ninth item, 
"Defendant's Prior Record." Jurors were required to rate 
each item as to perceived importance, a rating of "l" indica-
ting highest importance and "9," lowest importance. Mean 
importance ratings for all these items are presented in 
Table XIV. Each item will be considered separately. 
Amount of Money in the Defendant's Possession When 
Arrested. When the defendant was arrested, he had $70 in his 
possession, a rather large amount, considering that he had 
been unemployed for the previous few months, his only income 
being $55 per week from the Employment Commission. In addi-
tion, his explanation for having had such an amount was 
flimsy. Because of this situation, the amount of money was 
damaging to his case. 
Jurors who were presented with a prior record reflecting 
a previous crime against a person were much more likely to 
assign greater importance to this item of evidence than were 
Independent Amt 
Variable !! Money 
-
Overall 144 3.44 
Severitya 
Low 72 ).61 
High 72 3.28 
Nature a 
Property 72 3.97 
Person 72 2.92 
Sev. X Natures 
Lo X Prop. )6 4.11 
Lo X Per. )6 3.11 
Hi X Prop. 36 3.83 
Hi X Per. )6 2.72 
TABLE XIV 
MEANS - EVIDENCE IMPORTANCE ITEMS 
Phys Victim Amt Lack of Bar 
Test ID Alcoh Corrob Test 
6.30 ).Jl 5. )5 4.60 4.01 
6.46 3.36 5.00 5.13 4.4) 
6.14 3.25 5.69 4.07 J.60 
6.53 3.49 4.93 4.71 4. 56 
6.07 J.l) 5.76 4.49 J.47 
6.75 3.58 4.92 5.36 4.58 
6.17 3.13 5.08 4.89 4.28 
6.31 3.39 4.94 4.06 4. 53 
























those in the crime against property condition, ! (1, 140) = 
8.22, ~~.005 (Ms= 2.92 and 3.97 for crime against person 
and property, respectively). Severity of the prior record 
had no significant effect, nor did the interaction (see 
Table XV). 
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Importance ratings for this evidence item were correla-
ted significantly with those of four otherss the victim's 
identification of the defendant as his assailant (r=.16), the 
amount of alcohol consumed by the victim and defendant 
(r=-.25), the absence of stains on the defendant's clothes 
when arrested (r=-.26), and the defendant's acco~t of his 
own activities on the night of the crime (r=-.29). Given the 
damaging character of the amount of money, these relation-
ships appear reasonable. The first of the four items is dama-
ging, so a positive relationship would be expected; the second 
is ambiguous; the third and fourth are non-damaging, making 
the negative correlations reasonable. 
Physician's Testimony. The physician's role in the trial 
was to testify as to the extent of the victim's injuries; he 
never presented testimony either favoring or damaging the de-
fendant's case. It is understandable, therefore, that the 
characteristics of the prior record did not affect signif i-
eantly the jurors' ratings on this item. The overall mean 
rating was 6.3, indicating that jurors generally did not 
consider this item very important. 
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item of evidence, the victim's identification of the defendant 
(r=-.19). The physician's testimony may be characterized as 
ambiguous evidence and, as such, its negative association 
with an item which was very damaging is understandable. 
Victim's Identification of the Defendant !§. His Assail-
~· This item was one of the more damaging items of evi-
dence in the trial. The victim testified that, while lying 
on the ground after being hit the first time, he looked up 
and saw the defendant's face just before being kicked in the 
face. The damaging nature of the item was mitigated somewhat 
by the victim's admission of being dazed and almost uncon-
scious when he saw the defendant. Despite this latter cir-
cumstance, however, jurors rated this item as the most 
important one overall, the mean rating being 3.31. 
Neither of the independent variables manipulated in this 
study, nor their interaction, affected significantly the im-
portance rating of this item. However, it was correlated 
significantly with several items. There was a positive rela-
tionship between the victim's identification and two other 
damaging itemsa the bartender's testimony (r=.28) and the 
defendant's prior record (r=.19). The victim's identifica-
tion was negatively related to the absence of stains on the 
defendant's clothes when arrested (r=-.40) and the defen-
dant's account of his own activities on the night of the 
robbery (r=-.17), both of these being non-damaging. Finally, 
it was related negatively to one ambiguous item, the amount 
of alcohol consumed (r=-.41). These relationships are 
aligned appropriately, demonstrating consistency. 
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Amount 2f Alcohol Consumed ~ the Victim and Defendant 
.Q!! the Night .2f ~ Crime. Both the victim and the defendant 
had been drinking beer on the evening of the crime, just 
prior to the robbery. The amount, however, was ambiguous. 
This ambiguity may have led jurors to assign more or less im-
portance to this item, depending on the experimental condi-
tion. Jurors who had been presented with a prior record 
reflecting a crime against property perceived the amount of 
alcohol as more important than those in the crime against 
person condition, F (1, 140) = 4.56, £<·035 (see Table XVI). 
The means reflecting this relationship were 4.93 and 5.76 for 
crime against property and person, respectively. Further, 
both the severity or the prior record and the interaction 
achieved marginal significance. There was a tendency for 
jurors in the low severity treatment condition to assign 
greater importance to this item than did those in the high 
severity condition, ! (1, 140) = 3.16, £< .078 (Ms = 5.00 and 
5,69, respectively). The means reflecting the interaction 
between the two independent variables, F (l, 140) = 2.92, 
£< .09, indicate that there was little difference between the 
importance ratings of jurors who were in the crime against 
property cells (4.92 versus 4.94) but a substantially greater 
difference between the two cells in the crime against person 
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The ratings on this item, the amount of alcohol, were 
positively related to those of the absence of stains on the 
defendant's clothes when arrested (r=.39), but negatively 
related to three damaging items1 the lack of corroboration 
for the defendant's testimony (r=-.19), the bartender's test-
imony (r=-.42), and the defendant's prior record (r=-.22). 
These alignments seem reasonable. 
Defendant's Lack of Corroboration for His Own Account .............................. ..._~ ----- -- --- --- ---- ................ ..-...-
0 f His Activities .Q!l .!!:!!. Night .2.! lh!, Crime. The defendant 
had his own version of what happened on the night the robbery 
occurred. Although his testimony involved an account which 
precluded his guilt, no witnesses were found who could corro-
borate his story. This lack of corroboration was a damaging 
item of information. 
Jurors who were presented with a prior record which in-
dicated a previous crime of high severity rated this item as 
more important than those who had been exposed to a low~ 
severity prior record, F (1, 140) = 8.28, ~ < .005 (Ms = 5.13 
and 4.07 for low and high seve~ity, respectively, see Table 
XVII). Neither the nature of the prior record nor the 
interaction achieved significance. This item was, however, 
correlated significantly with one other evidence item, the 
absence of stains on the defendant's clothes when arrested 
(r=-.34). Since the defendant's lack of corroboration is 
damaging, and the absence of stains -is non-damaging, the neg-
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Bartender's Testimony. During the trial, the bartender 
testified that he had seen the defendant follow the victim 
out of the bar on the night of the robberyr since the crime 
took place just outside the bar, this item was very damaging 
to the defendant's case. 
Importance ratings on this item were influenced signi-
ficantly by both independent variables and by their interac-
t ion (see Table XVIII). A prior record indicating high 
severity was associated with higher importance ratings on 
this item, F (1, 140) = 6.oo, E(.016 (Ms= 3.6 for high and 
4.43 for low severity). Further, a prior record showing a 
crime against person led to much higher ratings, f (1, 140) = 
10.15, E(.002. The means reflecting this relationship were 
3.47 for crime against person, compared with 4.56 for crime 
against property. The Severity X Nature interaction was also 
significant, F (1, 140) = 5.23, E (.025. Jurors perceived 
this item as most_j.~£~tant in the high severity condition 
when the previous crime was against a person (M = 2.67) and 
least important when the prior record indicated a low sever-
ity crime against property (M = 4.58). 
The bartender's testimony was significantly correlated 
with one other damaging item of information, the defendant's 
prior record (r=.19). Jurors who rated the bartender's 
testimony as important also perceived the defendant's prior 
record as important. Negative relationships resulted between 
the bartender's testimony and two non-damaging itemsa the 
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(r=-.41) and the defendant's account of his own activities on 
the night of the crime (r=-.16). All of these relationships 
are consistent, the damaging item being aligned positively 
with another damaging item and negatively with non-damaging 
items. 
Absence of Stains .Q!1 the Defendant's Clothes When 
Arrested. When the defendant was arrested, the morning after 
the robbery, he was wearing the same clothes that he had been 
wearing when the crime occurred; no blood stains appeared on 
them, however. Since the lack of stains indicated his pos~ 
sible innocence, this item was non-damaging. 
Both the severity and nature of the prior offense in-
fluenced jurors' perceptions of the importance of this item 
(see Table XIX). Jurors in the high severity condition rated 
this item significantly less important than those in the low 
severity condition,! (l, 140) = 5.72, ~( .02 (Ms= 4.56 for 
low severity versus 5.74 for high severity). Likewise, those 
jurors in the crime against person treatment condition per-
ceived the absence of stains as much less important than 
those who were in the crime against property condition, 
! (1, 140) = 10.46. ~< .002. The means reflecting this rela-
tionship were 4.35 and 5.94 for crime against property and 
crime against person, respectively. Since the absence of 
stains on the defendant's clothes is evidence favoring the 
defendant, it seems possible that the prior record influenced 






ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR PERCEIVED 
IMPORTANCE OF THE ABSENCE OF 
STAINS ON THE DEFENDANT'S 
CLOTHES WHEN ARRESTED 
D.F. Sum of F-Value 
Squares 
1 50.17 5.72 
1 91.84 10.46 
Severity X Nature 1 .84 .10 
Error 140 1229.08 
* :e. .02 






the previous offense was severe and when it was a crime _ , 
against a person. This interpretation is supported by the 
significant negative correlation between the absence of 
stains and the defendant's prior record (r=-.18). 
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Defendant's Account ~His .Q?!!! Activities the Night ~ 
the Crime. Since the defendant, during his testimony, in-
sisted upon his innocence, this item was considered non-
damaging. Nature of the prior record was significantly 
associated with jurors' perceptions of the importance of this 
item, F (1, 140) = 5.87, £< .02 (see Table XX). It was rated 
significantly less important when jurors had been informed of 
a prior offense against a person than when the prior record 
was against property ems = 4.04 and 4.89 for crime against 
property and person, respectively). The same interpretation 
may be made here as in the immediately preceding item. 
Defendant's Prior Record. The defendant's prior crimi-
nal record was not presented as evidence during the trial. 
It was presented by the Officer of the Court (the experi-
menter) at the beginning of the defendant's cross-examination, 
and was immediately followed by appropriate judicial instruc-
tion concerning the proper use of the prior record, i.e., as 
information bearing on credibility but not as evidence of 
guilt (see Appendix H). The defendant's prior record was in-
cluded on the evidence importance instrument in order to see 
how the jurors would rate it. If they had followed instruc-
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TABLE XX 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR PERCEIVED 
IMPORTANCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
ACCOUNT OF HIS OWN 
ACTIVITIES 
D. F. Sum of F-Value 
Squares 
1 .34 .08 
1 25.84 5.87 








case, since, technically, it should not have been considered 
as evidence in the trial. The overall mean rating on this 
item was 7.39, which was the lowest overall mean obtained on 
this instrument. The range, however, was 2 to 9. 
Importance ratings on this item were influenced by the 
nature of the previous offense (see Table XX!), but not by 
severity nor by the interaction. Jurors tended to consider 
the prior record more important when it reflected a crime 
against person than when the crime was against property, 
F (1, 140) = 7.71, ~<.006 (Ms= 7.81 and 6.97 for crime 
against property and person, respectively). 
Summary. As was the case in the general questionnaire 
items, the characteristics of the prior record seemed to have 
a rather widespread effect on the importance ratings of these 
evidence items. In general, when the prior record reflected 
a high severity crime or a crime against person, damaging 
items of information were emphasized, obtaining higher impor-
tance ratings, while non-damaging items were de-emphasized, 
obtaining significantly lower ratings. 
Interrelationships among these items seem to be aligned 
in a logically consistent manner. Jurors who considered 
damaging evidence as most important tended to perceive non-
damaging evidence as relatively unimportant, and vice versa. 
Evidence Recall Instrument 






ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR PERCEIVED 
IMPORTANCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
PRIOR RECORD 
D.F. Sum of F-Value 
Squares 
1 a.03 2.48 
l 25.00 7.71 
Severity X Nature 1 i.36 .42 
Error 140 453.83 
* .:e. ( .12 







true-false questions testing their recall of evidence and in-
formation presented during the trial. Ten of these items 
tested recall of facts which favored the defendant's case, 
ten of them, facts which were damaging, and the remaining 15, 
irrelevant or neutral bits of information. Mean accuracy 
scores for the various conditions may be examined in Table 
XXII. The scores for "relevant" questions represent a sim-
ple addition of the "guilty" scores and the "not guilty" 
scores. 
The only main effect noted was the significant influence 
of severity upon the number of relevant true-false items re-
called correctly (see Table XXIII). Jurors in the low sever-
ity condition scored significantly higher on this portion of 
the test, F (1, 140) = 5.12, ~<.025 (fils = 17.63 versus 17.08 
for low and high severity, respectively). 
Accuracy on the items indicating the defendant's guilt 
was inversely correlated with jurors' certainty of their ver-
dicts (r=-.17); those who were most certain tended to score 
lowest on this portion of the test. Jurors who perceived the 
defense attorney as capable tended to score low on the "not 
guilty" items (r=-.19) and on the test as a whole (r=-.28). 
Finally, those jurors whose initial verdict was guilty tended 
to score low on the "relevant" items (r=-.19). 
Control Group 
The control group was included in this experiment so 
that overall effects of presence of a prior record could be 
TABLE XXII 
MEANS - EVIDENCE RECALL INSTRUMENT 
Independent Not 
Variable !! Glty Glty Neut Relev 
Overall 144 8.75 8.60 12.80 17.40 
Severitys 
Low 72 8.88 8.75 12.79 17.63 
High 72 8.63 8.46 12.79 17.08 
Natures 
Property 72 8.75 8.64 12.85 17.J9 
Person 72 8.75 8.57 12.74 17.32 
Sev. X Natures 
Lo X Prop. 
Lo X Per. 
Hi X Prop. 





36 8.83 8.72 12.78 17.56 
)6 8.92 8.78 12.81 17.69 
)6 8.67 8.56 12.92 17.22 
36 8.58 8.36 12.67 16.94 
TABLE XXIII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR RECALL OF 
VERDICT-RELEVANT ITEMS 
D. F. Sum of F-Value 
Squares 
1 10.56 5.12 
1 .17 .oa 
Severity X Nature 1 1.56 .76 
Error 140 288.64 
















assessed. Examination was planned to explore the influence 
of prior record upon the verdict and sentence behavior of the 
jurors. The data indicate, however, that the verdict and 
sentencing behavior of the control group was exactly the same 
as that for the low severity crime against property groups; 
in each case there was one guilty verdict and the sentence 
was five years. Since the overall analysis of variance indi-
cated no significant influence by the independent variables, 
no comparison between the experimental groups and the control 
group was conducted. 
Alternates 
Of the to~al of ~5 alternates who participated in this 
research study, 13 were involved in the low severity condi-
tion, four in the crime against property cell and nine in the 
crime against person cell. Two alternates participated in 
the high severity condition, one each in the crime against 
property and crime against person cells. These alternates 
viewed the trial and received information about the prior 
record along with the jurors, though seated in a separate 
group, but did not deliberate. Immediately after the trial, 
while the juries were deliberating, the alternates rendered 
individual verdicts and completed the three paper/pencil 
tasks. 
Analyses of variance were computed in order to detect 
significant effects of the treatments upon the dependent 
variables. Results of significant effects, as well as the 
8J 
means involved, are presented in Appendix K. 
A comparison between data for the juries and that for 
alternates reveals that, overall, the independent variables 
had much more significant influence when deliberation took 
place. While the relationship between nature of the prior 
record and jury verdicts achieved marginal significance, 
there was no statistical significance when the verdicts of 
the alternates was considered. Paranthetically. it should 
be noted that, even though there were no statistically sig-
nificant effects of the independent variables upon the ver-
dicts of alternates, 12 of the 15 found the defendant guilty, 
compared with 10 of 24 juries ~ho found him guilty. 
Juror ratings on eight of the items from the general 
questionnaire were systematically influenced by the indepen-
dent variables; for the alternates, only two of these items 
achieved significance, both interactions. The Severity X 
Nature interaction relationship with relevance of the prior 
record in determining the defendant's guilt was, for the 
alternates, only marginally significant, F (l, 11) = J.97, 
£( .07. The second item where the interaction was signifi-
cant was the alternates' certainty that the victim was not 
mistaken in his testimony, ! (1, 11) = 3.90, £ ( .07. Pos-
sibly, juror deliber.ation acted as a reciprocal process of 
clarifying information which polarized post-deliberation 
reactions to the information contained in the trial. 
Juror importance ratings on seven of the nine items of 
evidence were influenced significantly by the independent 
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variables. In contrast, only two of the evidence items were 
affected when the raters were alternates. First, the defen-
dant's lack of corroboration was influenced significantly by 
the Severity X Nature interaction, F (1, 11) = 9.2, R< .01. 
Second, severity of the prior record was significantly re-
lated to the perceived importance of the physician's test-
imony, with alternates in the high severity treatment 
condition tending to rate this item as much more important 
than those in the low severity condition, F (1, 11) = 7.33, 
~ <.02. This relationship is interesting, since, as pre-
viously noted, the physician supplied testimony that neither 
favored nor damaged the defendant's case. Apparently, to 
this extent at least, deliberation served to clarify the 
proper relationships among these evidence items, since the 
ratings of the jurors on this item were not systematically 
influenced by the independent variables. 
Overall, it seems possible that group deliberation pro-
vided the advantage of reciprocal clarification and organi-
zation of perceptions which resulted in ratings which were 




All juries which participated in this re~arch viewed 
the same trial in which the evidence was ambiguous. It con-
sisted of conflicting testimony and no physical evidence. 
The juries should have, therefore, found the defendant not 
guilty, based on the principles of presumption of innocence 
and reasonable doubt as outlined in the judge's instructions. 
Ten of the 24 experimental juries, however, returned guilty 
verdicts. 
All juries expressed the desire for more testimony from 
more witnesses during their deliberations as well as during 
the post-experimental debriefing sessions. They wanted not 
only reliable, credible witnesses, but eyewitnesses who 
actually viewed the assault. They wanted, it seems, an "open 
and shut case," which could be decided with absolute certain-
ty, even though jurors in actual litigation seldom try cases 
which are unambiguous. Their task during deliberation was to 
select the facts from lengthy, often ambiguous testimony, a 




A total of 10 of the 24 experimental juries returned 
guilty verdicts. Although neither of the independent varia-
bles, nor their interaction, affected significantly jury ver-
dicts, examination of the results indicates that there was a 
definite trend for both severity and nature of the prior 
record to influence verdict. The trend was apparent especial-
ly when the nature of the crime is considered (three guilty 
verdicts in the crime against property condition compared 
with seven in the crime against person condition). If the 
number of juries had been higher, the results probably would 
have beeri statistically significant. Even with the low num-
ber of guilty verdicts in this study, the relationship between 
nature of the prior record and verdict nearly achieved 
significance. 
Two of the 24 juries reported themselves "hung" after an 
initial period of deliberation1 both of these were split 4-2 
(four guilty, two not guilty) on the initial ballot. Jury 9, 
in the low severity crime against person treatment condition, 
eventually returned a verdict of guilty, indicating that those 
in the minority changed their votes to achieve unanimity. 
However, in Jury 24, which was in the high severity crime 
against person condition, the minority was able to persuade 
the majority to switch sides, the final verdict in this group 
being not guilty. Apparently, the two in the minority on the 
first ballot were subsequently allied and were able to con-
vince the four that there was reasonable doubt as to the def-
endant' a guilt. The deliberation time expended by this jury 
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was the longest of any recorded--89 minutes. 
In 19 of the 24 juries, the majority opinion as expres-
sed on the first ballot turned out to be the final verdict of 
the group. In five cases, however, the majority changed 
their opinions in order to reach a final unanimous jury ver-
dict. All of these juries began with an initial split of 4-2 
(four guilty, two not guilty), and all eventually found the 
defendant not guilty. Three juries were in the low severity 
crime against property condition, and two were in the high 
severity crime against person cell. The change of the ini-
tial majority opinion in these juries appeared unrelated to 
longer deliberation times. Although the time required by 
Jury 24 was, as previously noted, the longest time recorded, 
the deliberation times for the remaining four juries were not 
inordinately long (range was 14 to 22 minutes); apparently, 
those members were convinced rather easily. 
In general, jurors who returned guilty verdicts were 
more certain of their verdicts than jurors who returned ver-
dicts of not guilty. Further, guilty-voting jurors tended to 
perceive the defendant's prior record as relevant in judging 
his credibility as a witness !!!£! as evidence of guilt in the 
present case. These jurors' self-reports indicated that the 
prior record did enter into their deliberation and decision 
process as evidence of guilt. The taped deliberations 
showed, however, that they did not overtly discuss the prior 
record as evidence of guilt. This finding seems to indicate 
that guilty-voting jurors either did not follow judge's 
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instructions or could not distinguish between the use of the 
prior record in judging credibility and its use as evidence 
of guilt. 
Apparently, the items of evidence emphasized by the 
juries who returned guilty verdicts differed from those em-
phasized by the juries voting not guilty. Four items of evi-
dence correlated significantly with a final verdict of guilty, 
and three with a verdict of not guilty. Juries who voted 
guilty emphasized the eyewitness testimony of the victim and 
bartender, the physician's testimony, and the defendant's 
lack of corroboration. Since all of these items were damaging 
to the defendant's case except the physician's testimony, 
which was ambiguous, these ratings seem generally consistent 
with the verdicts that were returned. The juries which re-
turned verdicts'. of not guilty emphasized the importance of 
the amount of alcohol consumed, which was ambiguous, the ab-
sence of stains on the defendant's clothes when arrested, 
which was non-damaging, and the amount of money found on the 
defendant when arrested, which was damaging. This latter 
item would seem to be inconsistent with verdicts of not 
guilty, an inconsistency which will be explored later. Des-
pite the apparent inconsistency just noted, these ratings 
overall demonstrate consistency, with damaging evidence per-
ceived as more important for guilty-voting jurors and non-
damaging evidence more important for those who had returned 
verdicts of not guilty. 
Deliberation time was not affected by either the 
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independent variables or their interaction. The actual trial 
evidence in all conditions was held constants apparently the 
characteristics of the prior record had no significant effect 
on the time needed by the juries to discuss the evidence and 
reach their verdicts. 
Likewise, no statistically significant effects resulted. 
from the analysis of sentences recommended by the ten juries 
who returned guilty verdicts. However, since the mean sen-
tence recommended by juries in the high severity condition 
was almost twice that in the low severity condition, a larger 
sample probably would have resulted in a statistically signi-
ficant result for this dependent variable. 
The leng1th of sentence was positively correlated with 
juror certainty of verdicts those jurors who recommended 
longer sentences were more certain of their verdicts than 
were those who recommended shorter sentences. This relation-
ship demonstrates consistency. 
The Jurors 
Elev.en i terns were included on the general questionnaire, 
which elicited jurors' reactions to the evidence and the 
trial. Overall, the correlations indicated that jurors demon-
strated internal consistency. In addition, juror ratings of 
these items were consistent with the verdicts they returned 
and with their importance ratings of the items of evidence 
included on the evidence importance instrument. 
Of the eleven items, the two most critical ones were 
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those asking the jurors to rate the relevance of the defen-
dant's prior record in determining his credibility as a 
witness and as evidence of guilt in the trial. A third cru-
cial item was the perceived relevance of the judge's instruc-
tions during deliberation. These three questions were 
critical because they are directly relevant to the research 
question posed in this study. 
The relationship between severity of the prior record 
and perceived relevance of the judge's instructions was sig-
nificant. High severity was associated with higher juror 
ratings on this item. Further, severity interacted with the 
nature of the crime, the high severity crime against person 
treatment producing the highest ratings, and the low severity 
crime against property condition, the lowest ratings. The 
jurors in the high severity cells may have focused on the 
judge's instructions more than those in the low severity con-
ditions, in a sense, perhaps high-severity jurors "needed" 
the instructions more because a more severe prior record was 
more difficult to handle properly. If these jurors paid more 
attention to the judge's instructions, they would be expected 
to perceive the instructions as more relevant. As previously 
noted, however, jurors who voted guilty appear to have been 
unable to follow the instructions regarding proper use of the 
prior record. 
Despite the significant relationships between the inde-
pendent variables and perceived relevance of judicial in-
structions, which emphasized the correct use of the prior 
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record, the relevance of the prior record both for determining 
the defendant's credibility and as evidence of his guilt in 
the present case generally was affected by the independent 
variables. Both of the independent variables, and their in-
teraction, had a signi~icant effect on perceived relevance of 
the prior record in judging the defendant's credibility as a 
witness. Jurors gave higher ratings when the prior record 
was high-in severity or when it was a crime against a person. 
This relationship was expected, of course, since jurors are 
allowed to use the prior record in judging credibility. Un-
der these conditions, a prior record reflecting high severity 
and/or a crime against person would be expected to be per-
ceived as more relevant since the defendant's credibility 
would suffer greater damage (Hartshorne et al. notwithstand-
ing). Statistically significant negative correlations be-
tween perceived relevance of the prior record for credibility 
and certainty that the defendant was telling the truth indi-
cates that the jurors took these questions seriously, a con-
clusion which is supported by a similar consistency of 
answers on other items. 
Severity of the defendant's prior record had no signifi-
cant effect on perceived relevance of the prior record as 
evidence of guilt. However, the nature of the prior record 
and the interaction of the independent variables did affect 
these ratings significantly. When the prior record was a 
crime against person, it was seen as more relevant than when 
it indicated a crime against property. Further, jurors in 
the high severity cells were the most disparate in their 
judgments of the relevance of the prior record as evidence 
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of guilt, the lowest ratings occurring in the high severity 
crime against property cell and the highest in the high sev-
erity crime against person condition. Jurors tended, then, 
to perceive the defendant's prior record as relevant evidence 
for guilt when that prior record reflected a crime against 
person, and especially when it was a high severity crime 
against person. Moreover, the highly significant positive 
correlation between relevance of the prior record in deter-
mining the defendant's credibility and as evidence of his 
guilt suggests that jurors are unable to distinguish cogni-
tively between these two ways of considering the prior record. 
This finding, of course, contradicts the assumption by the 
judicial system that they are able to make this distinction. 
In addition to the eleven questions included on the 
general questionnaire, eight items of evidence were chosen 
from the videotaped trial to appear on the evidence impor-
tance instrument. These items were pivotal points of evi-
dence which favored either the prosecution or the defense, 
or were ambiguous. Two of them involved eyewitness testi-
monys the hart.ender's testimony and the victim's identifi-
cation of the defendant as his assailant. In addition to 
these eight ite•s of evidence, a ninth was also included, 
"Defendant's Prior Record." 
The amount of money in the defendant's possession when 
arrested was damaging to the defendant's case because it was 
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large and the defendant was unable to explain his possession 
of it. This item was rated as the second most important 
item on the list; only the victim's identification of the de-
fendant as the perpetrator of the crime was rated as more 
important. 
The significant correlations between this item and other 
items of evidence are aligned consistently. Its positive re-
lationship with the importance of the victim's identification, 
and its negative relationship with perceived importance of 
the absence of stains on the defendant's clothes and the def-
endant's account of his own activities on the night of the 
crime are all reasonable. 
One source of apparent inconsistency is the relationship 
between the amount of money in the defendant's possession 
when arrested and several items on the general questionnaire. 
Since this item of evidence was damaging, its negative rela-
tionship with verdicts of guilty, and its positive relation-
ships with ratings of the relevance of the prior record for 
credibility, and with certainty that the victim and bartender 
were not mistaken seem to demonstrate inconsistency. 
This apparent inconsistency may be understood, however, 
by examining closely these relationships. Guilty-voting 
jurors tended to perceive the prior record as relevant for 
determining the defendant's credibility. Their use of the 
prior record in this manner apparently led them to disbelieve 
the defendant's testimony. Thus, the amount of money in his 
possession when arrested was given little importance, since 
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his overall credibility suffered in light of his prior record. 
The prior record/credibility variable was related in the same 
negative way to all the evidence items which rested directly 
and solely on the defendant's testimony. Jurors who used the 
prior record for credibility tended to discount the defen-
dant's whole testimony; therefore, they rated the amount of 
money in his possession as unimportant. 
The physician's testimony was considered important since 
the physician testified to the seriousness of the victim's 
injuries. In terms of the defendant's guilt or innocence, 
however, it did not constitute "evidence." The physician did 
attest to the victim's injuries, but he did not present evi-
dence either favoring or damaging the defendant's case. The 
mean overall importance rating for this item was 6.J, the 
lowest rating of all the eight items of evidence. 
The victim's identification of the defendant as his 
assailant was one of the most damaging items of evidence in 
the trial; the mean rating of 3.31 was the highest importance 
rating achieved. The significant correlations between this 
item and several others are aligned appropriately. It was 
positively related with two other damaging items, the barten-
der's testimony and the defendant's prior record, and nega-
tively related with two non-damaging items. Overall, then, 
the relationsh~ps demonstrate consistency. 
The amount of alcohol consumed by the victim and defen-
dant on the evening the robbery took place was somewhat ambi-
guous and therefore was generally non-damaging. The nature 
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of the prior record affected significantly the importance 
ratings of this item. Jurors in the crime against person 
treatment condition assigned less importance to it than those 
in the crime against property condition. Further, both the 
severity of the prior record and the interaction achieved 
marginal significance. Jurors in the high severity condition 
tended to perceive the amount of alcohol consumed as less im-
portant than those in the low severity treatment. The means 
reflecting the interaction indicated that little difference 
existed between the two cells in the crime against property 
cells, but a substantially greater difference existed between 
the two cells in the crime against person condition. Since 
the amount of alcohol consumed was relatively non-damaging, 
it is possible that a prior record indicating high severity 
and/or a crime against person influenced the jurors to dis-
count this item and thus to rate it as less important; jurors 
in the low severity and/or crime against property condition, 
on the other hand, inflated their ratings. 
This item correlated significantly with several other 
items in a consistent manner. The amount of alcohol consumed 
was positively related to the absence of stains on the defen-
dant's clothes, a non-damaging item, but negatively related 
to three damaging items1 the defendant's lack of corrobora-
tion, the bartender's testimony, and the defendant's prior 
record. 
The defendant's lack of corroboration for his own ac-
count of his actions on the night of the crime, a damaging 
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item of evidence, was significantly affected by severity of 
the prior record. Jurors in the high severity treatment con-
dition perceived it as more important than those in the low 
severity condition. Since the defendant's lack of corrobora-
~ion was damaging, a prior record indicating high severity 
apparently led the jurors in increase their importance 
ratings on the item. 
In addition to the significant influence of severity of 
the prior record, this item was correlated negatively with 
importance ratings for the absence of stain& on the defen-
dant's clothes when arrested. Given the nature of these two 
items, the ratings appear consistent. 
The bartender's testimony was very damaging to the de-
fendant 'a case, and its importance ratings were affected 
significantly by both independent variables and by their 
interaction. Higher ratings were associated with a prior 
record indicating a crime of high severity and a crime 
against person. Jurors perceived this item as most impor-
tant when in the high severity crime against person cell, 
and least important when in the low severity crime against 
property condition. 
As in the case of other items considered, the signifi-
cant correlations between this item and several other items 
demonstrate consistency. The bartender's testimony is dama-
ging, so its significant positive relationship with the 
defendant's prior record is reasonable. Further, the nega-
tive relationships between the bartender's testimony and two 
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non-damaging items, the absence of stains on the defendant's 
clothes and the defendant's account of his own activities on 
the night of the crime, are also consistent. 
When the defendant was arrested, no blood stains appeared 
on his clothing--clothing which h,e. apparently had been wearing 
the night before, when the crime was committed. Since this 
item was favorable to the defendant's case, it was considered 
to be non-damaging. 
Importance ratings on this item were affected signifi-
cantly by both the severity and nature of the prior offense. 
Jurors in the high severity condition rated the absence of 
stains as significantly less important, as did those in the 
crime against person condition. Since the absence of stains 
favored the defendant's case, it may be that the prior record 
influenced the jurors to discount this non-damaging item when 
the previous crime was severe and when it was a crime against 
a person. This interpretation is supported by the significant 
negative relationship between importance ratings of the ab-
sence of stains and those for the defendant's prior record. 
The defendant denied having committed the crime and pre-
sented an aeeount of his own activities which precluded his 
guilt; this item, therefore, was non-damaging. The nature of 
the prior record significantly influenced jurors' perceptions 
of the importance of this item. Ratings indicated signifi-
cantly less perceived importance when the previous crime was 
an offense against a person than when it was a crime against 
property. 
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Even though the defendant's prior record was not pre-
sented as evidence in the trial, it was included on the evi-
dence importance instrument in order to explore the jurors' 
ability to follow judicial instructions. If they had followed 
instructions, this item should have been marked with a "9" 
(least important) in every case. The overall mean rating for 
this item was the lowest of all the items on the question-
naire, but the range of ratings was from 2 to 9. Jurors in 
the crime against person condition perceived the prior record 
as much more important than did those in the crime against 
property treatment. Again, the type of prior record led 
jurors to emphasize the importance of this item. 
The evidence recall questionnaire was composed of 35 
true-false items eliciting jurors' recall of evidence and in-
formation presented during the trial. Ten of these items 
tested recall of facts which favored the defendant's case, 
ten of them, facts which were damaging, and the remaining 15, 
irrelevant or neutral bits of information. The scores for 
"relevant" questions were computed by adding the "guilty" and 
"not guilty" scores together. 
Jurors in the low severity treatment condition scored 
significantly higher on the relevant questions than did those 
in the high severity condition. Recall of the facts perhaps 
was clouded by the high severity prior record which inter-
fered with their memories more than did the low severity 
prior record. In addition, accuracy on the "guilty" items 
was inversely correlated with certainty of their verdictsr 
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those who scored highest tended to be least certain of their 
verdicts. Since the evidence presented in the trial was con-
flicting and inconclusive, jurors who remembered this evi-
dence more accurately might be expected to report less' 
certainty of the correctness of their verdicts. 
The Alternates 
A comparison between data for the juries and that for 
alternates revealed that, overall, the independent variables 
had much more significant influence when deliberation took 
place. While the relationship between nature of the defen-
dant's prior record and jury verdicts achieved marginal 
significance, the verdicts of alternates were not influenced 
significantly by the independent variables. 
Moreover, alternates' responses on only two items from 
the general questionnaire were systematically influenced by 
the independent variables, compared with eight items when 
juror ratings were considered. Likewise, two of the nine 
evidence importance items were affected signi£icantly when 
the raters were alternates, but seven were influenced signi-
ficantly when jurors rated them. 
Apparently, group deliberation was responsible for these 
disparities, since, in all other respects, the alternates 
were treated the same as the jurors. It appears that jury 
deliberation provided the advantage of reciprocal clarifica-
tion and organization of perceptions, resulting in ratings 
which were more significantly affected by the treatment 
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conditions. During deliberation, jurors emphasized various 
items of evidence which differed depending upon the experi-
mental condition. The discussion tended to result in per-
ceptions which were closer in agreement among the jurors in 
each condition. Since alternates did not deliberate, they 
did not have the benefit of this reciprocal process of 
clarification. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Since the trial evidence in all experimental conditions 
was ambiguous, involving conflicting testimony and no actual 
physical evidence, all juries should have returned verdicts 
of not guilty, based upon the legal principles of presump-
tion of innocence and reasonable doubt. Ten of the 24 juries, 
however, returned verdicts of guilty. Although the influence 
of the independent variables was not statistically signifi-
cant, varying the severity and nature of the defendant's 
prior record did result in a definite trend toward more 
guilty verdicts in the high severity and in the crime against 
person conditions. An increase in the number of juries used 
in this study probably would have resulted in statistical 
significance. Even with the small number of ten guilty ver-
dicts analyzed in this study, the relationship between the 
nature of the prior record and verdict achieved near 
significance. 
In general, jurors who returned guilty verdicts indica-
ted more certainty of their verdicts and perceived the 
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defendant's prior record as more relevant both for determin-
ing the defendant's credibility as a witness and as evidence 
for his guilt in the present case. This latter finding, 
coupled with the highly significant positive correlation be-
tween relevance of the prior record for credibility and as 
evidence of guilt indicates that, contrary to the legal as- . 
sumption, jurors may not be able to distinguish cognitively 
between these two uses of the prior record. If they do make 
this distinction, they fail to follow judicial admonitions 
regarding its proper use. 
Overall, juror responses on the general questionnaire 
demonstrated consistency with respect to both their verdicts 
and their importance ratings of the' items of evidence. In 
addition, their responses on the general questionnaire showed 
internal consistency; certainty of verdict was positively 
correlated with confidence in the testimony of the witnesses. 
The jurors' use of the prior record in judging the defendant's 
credibility seemed to have a rather generalized effect, lead-
ing them to discount, and therefore to rate as unimportant, 
several items of evidence which rested solely on the defen-
dant's testimony. 
As with the general questionnaire, jurors' importance 
ratings of the nine items included on the evidence importance 
instrument demonstrate overall consistency. In general, 
damaging items were positively correlated with one another 
and negatively correlated with non-damaging items. Jurors 
who tended to perceive one damaging item as important also 
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rated other damaging items as important; the same was true 
for non-damaging items. The introduction of a prior record 
reflecting a high severity crime and/or a crime against per-
son increased jurors' importance ratings of damaging evidence 
and, consequently, decreased their ratings of non-damaging 
items. 
Jurors tended, then, to integrate the trial evidence in 
a consistent manner. This consistency is demonstrated by the 
close relationships between verdict and the items on the var-
ious rating tasks as well as internal consistencies among the 
items themselves. 
REFERENCE NOTES 
(1) Baker, w. Personal communication, April 1), 1978. 
(2) Wall, R. L. Personal communication, March 9, 1978. 
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The State of Oklahoma versus Neal Garnett, Defendant. 
Charles H. Headrick, District Attorney of Payne County, 
State of Oklahoma, under and virtue of the authority vested 
in him as District Attorney, gives this Honorable Court to 
know and be informed in the name and by the authority of the 
State of Oklahoma, that in the County of Payne and State of 
Oklahoma, on the twelfth day of November, 1975, Neal Garnett, 
while acting alone, did commit the crime of Robbery by Force 
in the following form and fashion, to-wit: that is to say 
that the said defendant, Neal Garnett, while acting alone, 
then and there being, did willfully, wrongfully, unlawfully, 
and feloniously rob one James Lawrence, by wrongfully taking 
and carrying away certain money and personal property of 
value belonging to and in the possession of said James 
Lawrence, and in his immediate presence, without his consent 
and against his will, said robbery being accomplished by said 
defendant, while acting alone, by means of force and violence 
used against said James Lawrence by then and there kicking 
him and knocking him down onto the ground, beating and kick-
ing him about the head and body and then and there wrongfully 
taking and carrying the money and property aforesaid, in 
Violation of Title 21, Oklahoma State Statutes, Section 791, 
contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and 
provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of 
Oklahoma. 
lntr_9ducto~y Remarks 
JUDGE: Let the record show that the defendant is personally 
present in the courtroom with his court-appointed attor-
ney, Mr. Jackson. Is the State ready? 
PROSECUTOR: State's ready, Your Honor. 
JUDGE: Is the Defense ready? 
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JACKSON1 Yes, Your Honor. 
JUDGE1 Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, this is the case of 
the State of Oklahoma versus Neal Garnett. The charge 
is Robbery by Force. At this stage of the proceedings, 
the State will tell the plea of the defendant and make 
an opening statement, outlining in some detail the evi-
dence and witnesses to be called to prove their case 
today. Mr. Prosecutor ••• ? 
PROSECUTOR1 Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, to this charge 
the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. This is 
our whole reason for being here. At this point, I want 
to explain briefly to you what the evidence of the State 
will be. This case does not involve many people--we 
will call only four witnesses. First of all, the com-
plaining witness, James Lawrence, is the man who was 
with the defendant for a short time during the evening 
of the 12th of November, 1975· I anticipate that the 
evidence will show that Mr. Lawrence was in a bar in 
Cushing on that evening, and while at the bar he met the 
defendant and they had some drinks together. I further 
anticipate his testimony to indicate that, upon deciding 
to leave this establishment to go home, he was followed 
by the defendant, and that when he got outside the bar, 
he was hit from behind and knocked down. He was then 
beaten and kicked by the defendant, and was finally 
robbed of some personal property. His testimony will 
further indicate that, after this beating took place, he 
met cme of the other witnesses at another nearby bar and 
that this other witness took him to the hospital. Both 
Mr. Lawrence and this other witness will be able to tell 
you of Mr. Lawrence's condition when they met after 
Mr. Lawrence had been attacked. 
As to the witness Jack Simpson--! believe that his 
testimony will show that he is a bartender in Cushing 
and that he personnaly saw the defendant, Neal Garnett, 
follow Jim Lawrence out of the bar when Mr. Lawrence 
left that night. 
Our final witness will be Dr. Taylor, who was the 
physician on duty in the emergency room at the hospital 
where the victim was taken for treatment of his injuries. 
This witness will testify as to the extent of James 
Lawrence's injuries and the medical treatment that was 
required. 
Now, I anticipate that the State will not call any 
other witnesses, and after we present this case to you, 
and the defense has done so, too, you will reach a ver-
dict that will find this defendant guilty as charged. 
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JUDGE: At this stage of the case, Ladies and Gentlemen of 
the Jury, the defendant has an opportunity to make an 
opening statement or to reserve this opening statement 
until. a later stage of the proceedings. I now inquire, 
does the defendant wish to make an opening statement or 
reserve? 
JACKSONs The defendant will reserve, Your Honor. 
JUDGE: Fine, then, call your first witness for the State. 
~estimon3 of Victim 
PROSECUTOR: Q. State your name please. 
A. James Lawrence. 
Q. How old are you? 
A. Twenty. 
Q. And where do you live at the present time? 
A. In Cushing. 
Q. Are you employed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What do you do? 
A. I'm a clerk at a store in Cushing. 
Q. Directing your attention to the evening of the 12th 
of November, 1975, did you have occasion to be at 
the B. & L. Club in Cushing, Oklahoma, on that 
evening? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What were you doing there? 
A. I was there having a few beers and playing pool. 
Q. What time did you get there? 
A. Must have been about 7130. 
Q. What happened when you got there? 
A. Like I said, I ordered a beer and sat for awhile, 
then got another beer and started playing pool. 
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Q. Who were you playing pool with? 
A. I was playing pool with Neal Garnett, and we had 
some beers together. 
Q. Had you known the defendant, Neal Garnett, before 
this evening at the B. &·L. Club? 
A. I didn't really know him personally. I had seen 
him before in bars in Cushing, and had talked to 
him a little those other times. I knew who he was, 
but that's about all. 
Q. You said a moment ago that you and Mr. Garnett had 
some drinks together. Who paid for these drinks? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you pay for all of them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there any particular reason why you were paying 
for all the drinks? 
A. Yes. In talking with Neal Garnett, I found out that 
he was unemployed and hadn't worked for over two 
months. Since I had some money, and he didn't, I 
bought the beer for both of us. 
Q. How many drinks would you say you bought? 
A. I'd say about four or five rounds, at least. 
Q. Was the defendant present when you paid for them? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. Would you say, then, that the defendant had the 
opportunity to see that you had money with you? 
A. I suppose so, yes. 
Q. What time did you leave the B. & L. Club that night? 
A. Around l01JO or llrOO. 
Q. Why did you leave the club? 
A. It was getting late, and I had to get up early the 
next morning to go to work. 
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Q. Now, Mr. Lawrence, what happened when you decided 
to leave the bar? 
A. I told Neal that I was going to have to leave 
because of having to get up early the next morning. 
I got up to leave, and as I was walking out the 
door, I noticed that he was right behind me. 
Q. Did you think that was strange? 
A. Sort of, at first. Then I thought he must want a 
ride home. 
Q. Did you have a car or any form of transportation 
with you? 
A. Yes, I did. I had brought mjVpiekup with me, and I 
had gotten the keys out of my pocket as I was 
leaving the bar. 
Q. What happened after you noticed that the defendant 
was following you outside? 
A. As soon as I got out the door, I started to turn 
around to ask him if he wanted me to take him home. 
Just as I began to turn around, I was hit on the 
head from behind. 
Q. Do you know what you were hit with? 
A. No, I don't, but it knocked me down to the ground, 
and I was--I guess I was sort of dazed for a minute. 
The next thing I knew, I looked up and saw Neal 
Garnett's face and then he kicked me in the face. 
Q. You looked up and saw his face? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You:'re sure that the person you saw was Neal Garnett, 
the defendant in this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What happened after you were kicked in the face? 
A. I remember being hit again and again, and being 
kicked some more, in the stomach and on the back. 
Then I felt my wallet being pulled out of my pocket. 
Q. And then? 
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A. Then.the hitting and kicking stopped for a minute, 
and I tried to get up. 
Q. Were you able to get to your feet? 
A. After a few seconds, I was. 
Q. Then what did you do? 
A. I got up and tried to run away. Once I got away 
from him, I tried to get as far away as I could. I 
ran some, then walked, then ran again. 
Q. Why did you run away, Mr. Lawrence? 
A. I was afraid he'd kill me. 
Q. You believed that you might be killed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you do once you had run away? 
A. After I had gone a little way, I figured that I was 
safe. Then I thought about what to do. 
Q. And what did you decide to do? 
A. I decided that the best thing I could do would be to 
keep walking and see if I could get some help from 
someone. 
Q, Did you find someone to help you? 
A. Yes. I was walking along and came to another bar, 
Dorothy's Place, and saw someone standing out front, 
so I started running again, as best I could. 
Q. Did you know the person who was standing in front of 
this second bar? 
A. Yes. It was Bob Farrell, a man I had met through my 
sister a few months before. 
Q. What happened after you saw Mr. Farrell? 
A. I walked toward him. He recognized me and asked what 
in the world had happened. I told him I had been 
beaten and I needed help. 
Q. Were you in pain at this point, Mr. Lawrence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Great pain? 
A. Yes. I could hardly stay on my feet. 
Q. What did Mr. Farrell do? 
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A. He helped me get over to his car, and then he took 
me to the hospital. 
Q. Were you seen by a physician at this hospital? 
A. Yes. I believe his name was Dr. Taylor. He was in 
the emergency room when I got there. 
Q. How long did you stay at the hospital? 
A. Well, they kept me for five days. Something about--
they said I might have internal injuries. So they 
kept me. 
Q. Now, Mr. Lawrence, how much money would you say was 
in your wallet that night, when you decided to go 
home? 
A. I'd say probably about $80-$85. 
Q. How do you come up with that figure? 
A. Because I know how much I started out with, and how 
much I spent that night. 
Q. Allright, now, did you give anyone permission to 
remove your wallet that night? 
A. No, sir, I didn't. 
Q. And you are absolutely sure that it was Neal Garnett's 
face you saw right before being kicked in the face? 
A. Yes. 
PROSECUTORa Your witness. 
JACKSON: Q. Mr. Lawrence, you testified that you were 
drinking both before you met Mr. Garnett that night 
and you were drinking while the two of you were 
playing pool. Is that right? 
A. Yes, I was drinking beer. 
Q. And how many beers would you say you had during the 
course of that evening? 
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A. About five or six, I think. 
Q. Enough to get you high? 
A. Yes, I suppose so. 
Q. Enough to make you drunk? 
A. No sir. I was not drunk. 
Q. Alright, now, where did you say you were when you 
were hit the first time? 
A. Outside the B. & L. Club--just outside the door. 
Q. You also said you were dazed for a moment after you 
were hit the first time. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have any idea what could have gone on while 
you were dazed at this time? 
A. No sir, I don't. 
Q. Do you have any idea how long you were dazed? 
A. I can't say exactly, but it couldn't have been very 
long. 
Q. And you're absolutely sure that it was Neal Garnett 
who kicked you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Lawrence, how is it that, after being kicked and 
hit repeatedly, you were able to get away from your 
assailant so easily? 
A. I don't know. I guess, after he took my wallet out 
of my pocket, he was looking through it or something. 
Maybe he thought I was out and wasn't paying 
attention. 
Q. Alright, when you got away, why didn't you get in 
your pickup and drive away, instead of walking? 
A. I was running away--! just wanted to get away from 
there as fast as I could. Besides, I guess my keys 
were knocked out of my hand when I was attacked. I 
had them in my hand when I went through the door on 
my way outside, but when I got up to try to get away, 
I didn't have them. 
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Q. Alright, then what did you do, after you got up and 
started running? 
A. I ran down the street until I saw someone who I 
thought could help me. 
Q. And this was Mr. Farrell? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How far is it from the B. & L. Club to Dorothy's 
Place? 
A. About five or six blocks, I think. 
Q. And how long would you say it took you to get from 
the B. & L. Club to Dorothy's Place? 
A. I don't know. I guess it must have taken about 15 
or 20 minutes. 
Q. Mr. Lawrence, were you drunk that night? 
A. No sir. 
JACKSON& I have no further questions. 
JUDGEs Any further questions for the State? 
PROSECUTORa No, Your Honor. 
JUDGE1 You may step down. Next witness. 
Testimony of Robert Farrell 
PROSECUTORs Q. State your name, please. 
A. Robert Farrell. 
Q. How old are you, Mr. Farrell? 
A. Thirty years old. 
Q. What is your occupation? 
A. I own a service station in Cushing. 
Q. Do you know James Lawrence? 
A. Yes, I do. 
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Q. How long have you known him? 
A. I first met him last June. I had known his sister 
before then, and I met him at her house. 
Q. Mr. Farrell, where were you on the evening of 
November 12, 1975? 
A. I spent most of the evening at a bar in Cushing 
called Dorothy's Place. 
Q. And did you see James Lawrence that evening? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q, Please tell the court the circumstances under which 
you saw James Lawrence on that evening. 
A. I had been at this bar since about 9100. I decided 
to leave about 11130 and I went outside and all of 
a sudden I saw Jim walking toward me. 
Q. What kind of condition was he in? 
A. He was all bloody--his head and face had blood all 
over them, and he was kind of staggering. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. I ran up to him and asked what happened. 
Q. Then what? 
A. He told me what happened and I took him to the 
hospital. 
Q. In your opinion, Mr. Farrell, after seeing him and 
talking with him, what would you say his condition 
was? 
A. He couldn't hardly walk. I could see he was in pain. 
I had to help him get to my car so I could get help 
for him. 
Q. So when you saw him, it was obvious to you that he 
had been hurt--he had blood on him. 
A. Yes, sir. 
PROSECUTOR: Your witness. 
JACKSON1 I have no questions, Your Honor. 
JUDGE: Witness is excused. Next witness. 
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Testimony of Jack Simp~on 
PROSECUTOR1 Q. State your name, occupation, and place of 
employment, please. 
A. Jack Simpson. I'm a bartender at the B. & L. Club. 
Q. Were you working at the B. & L. Club on the evening 
of the 12th of November, 1975? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And did you see Jim Lawrence and Neal Garnett there 
that evening? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Do you know these two people? 
A. Yes, I do. Not very well, but I know them. 
Q. How long have you known them? 
A._-_ l've:;:s,een both o'f them at the B. & Le before. Jim 
Lawrence had been in four or five times before, that 
I know of. And I had seen Neal Garnett a couple of 
times before that night. 
Q. Were the two of them together that night? 
A. Well, Jim Lawrence got there before Neal Garnett 
did. But, yes, after awhile they were drinking 
together and playing pool. 
A. How long had Jim Lawrence been there when Neal Garnett 
arrived? 
A. Oh, I guess about a half hour or so. 
Q. You said they were drinking together. Did you 
personally serve them these drinks? 
A. Yes sir, I sure did. 
Q. And you personally took the money paid for the drinks? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Simpson, who paid for those drinks? 
A. Near as I can remember, Jim Lawrence paid for them. 
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Q. All of them? 
A. I believe so, yes sir. 
Q. Did you notice when Jim Lawrence left the B. & L. 
Club? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What time was that? 
A. I'm not sure, but I think it was about lOtJO or so. 
Q. Did he leave alone? 
A. No. Neal Garnett was with him. 
Q. Was Mr. Garnett in front of him or behind him? 
A. Behind him, I think. 
Q. And after they left, was that the last time you saw 
them that night? 
A. Yes, sir. 
PROSECUTOR1 Thank you, Mr. Simpson. Your witness. 
JACKSON1 Q. Mr. Simpson, how busy were you that night? 
A. What do you mean? 
Q. How many people were in the B. & L. Club? Did you 
stay busy serving drinks? 
A. Yes, I stayed pretty busy. It was about like any 
other night, I guess. 
Q. So even though you were busy, you still noticed when 
each of these men arriv.ed at the club and what they 
did and when they left? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you're absolutely sure that Jim Lawrence bought 
all the drinks that night for the two of them? 
A. Yes, sir, pretty sure. 
Q. And you clearly remember the two of them leaving? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And you are certain that they left at the same time 
and that the defendant, Neal Garnett, was walking 
behind Jim Lawrence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are fil:!r.!. that you could not be mistaken. 
A. Yes, I am sure. 
JACKSON1 No further questions, Your Honor. 
JUDGEa Any re-direct? 
PROSECUTORs No, Your Honor. 
JUDGEa You may step down. Next witness. 
Testimony of Dr. Hugh Taylor 
PROSECUTOR: Q. Your name please? . 
A. I am Dr. Hugh Taylor. 
Q. What do you do, sir? 
A. I am a physician and surgeon. 
Q. And where do you practice? 
A. Drumright, Oklahoma. 
Q. How long have you been practicing there, Dr. Taylor? 
A. Since 1969. 
PROSECUTOR1 I wonder if the defense attorney would be 
willing to stipulate to the doctor's qualifications? 
JACKSON1 So stipulated. 
JUDGE1 Very well. 
PROSECUTOR1 Q. Dr. Taylor, I'd ask you, in the early 
morning hours of the 13th of November, 19?5, did you 
have occasion to make an examination of one 
James Lawrence? 
A. Yes, I did. 
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Q. And where did this examination take place? 
A. In the Emergency Room at the hospi.tal in Drumright. 
Q. What did you observe about the physical condition 
of James Lawrence? 
A. The examination revealed bruises about the face, 
neck, chest, the lower back, the abdomen, both arms 
and legs, and over the left ear. There was blood 
draining from the nose and left ear. The eyes were 
swollen and bruised. The left eardrum was ruptured, 
the nose was fractured, and there was marked tender-
ness over the abdomen. 
Q. Now Doctor, do you have an opinion as to whether 
these injuries had been recently incurred by 
Mr. Lawrence? 
A. Yes. The blood was fresh. 
Q. And did you prescribe any further treatment for him? 
A. Yes. We admitted him to the hospital because of the 
abdominal findings. The examination I performed in-
dicated the possibility of inter-abdominal injury, 
so we put him to bed there in the hospital, so that 
we could monitor his condition. 
Q. Did you later come to any conclusion regarding the 
possibility of these further inj'uries? 
A. Yes. We monitored his blood count closely and watched 
his progress. There was no indication of internal 
bleeding, so I transferred his case. 
PROSECUTOR1 Your witness. 
JACKSON1 I have no questions. 
JUDGEs Witness is excused. Call your next. 
PROSECUTOR1 If it please the Court, the State rests. 
JUDGEt Is the Defense ready to proceed? 
JACKSONs Yes, Your Honor. 
JUDGEt Do you have an opening statement? 
JACKSONs Yes, Your Honor, we do. 
JUDGEt Fine, then, you may proceed. 
129 
JACKSON1 Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, I'd like to, if 
I could, briefly state what evidence we have to present 
at this time. · We are not questioning the fact that 
Mr. Lawrence was beaten and robbed. The issue in this 
ease is whether or not the defendant, Neal Garnett, was 
responsible for the beating and robbery. 
The basic thrust of the evidence starts the same as 
the evidence you've already heard from the State. How-
ever, I believe that the evidence will show that from 
the time Jim Lawrence left the B. & L. Club that night, 
the story is somewhat different. We have only one wit-
ness to call for the Defense--the defendant himself. 
After hearing his testimony, I believe that you will find 
for the defendant in this case. That is, I believe that 
you will return a verdict of not guilty. Thank you. 
JUDGEa Call your first witness. 
Testimon7 of Nea_l Garnett 
JACKSONa Q. State your name and age, please. 
A. My name is Neal Garnett, and I am 24 years old. 
Q. Now, Mr. Garnett, please tell us where you were in 
the early evening hours of November 12, 1975· 
A. I was at the B. & L. Club in Cushing. 
Q, Did you go there alone? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you at any time that evening talk with anyone 
else? 
A. Yes. 
Q, Please tell us the circumstances surrounding that 
conversation. 
A. Well, I got there about 7145 or 
beer and started playing pool. 
Lawrence and we started talking 
couple of games of pool. 
Q. Did you drink together? 
8100 and bought a 
Then I saw Jim 
and we played a 
A. Yes, we were drinking while we talked. 
Q. And who paid for these drinks? 
A. Well, Jim Lawrence paid for them. 
Q. Why did Mr. Lawrence pay for them? 
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A. He offered to, and so I thought that I would let him 
buy the first few, and then I'd buy a few later in 
the evening. 
Q. And did you buy a few later in the evening? 
A. No. I was going to, but then all of a sudden he 
said he had to leave, so I didn't. 
Q. Alright, Mr. Garnett. Now, what happened when 
Mr. Lawrence decided to leave? 
A. I said OK, and he got up and left. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. I went to the restroom. Then when I came out of the 
restroom, I finished the beer I had and then left. 
Q. How long would you say it was between the time 
Mr. Lawrence left and the time you left? 
A. Oh, probably at least 20 minutes or so. 
Q. What did you do when you left? 
A. I went to another olub. 
Q. And what is the name of this other club? 
A. It's right near the B. & L. The name of it is the 
Hot Spot, I think. 
Q. Now, Mr. Garnett, after Jim Lawrence left the B. & L. 
Club that night, did you see him again? 
A. No, I didn't see him any more that night. 
Q. What time did you leave this second bar? 
A. About llaJO. 
Q. What did you do then? 
A. I went home. 
Q. How did you happen to be arrested? I mean, where 
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were you when you were arrested? 
A. It was later that night, or rather early the next 
morning. The police came to my house and arrested 
me. 
Q. Mr. Garnett, did you attack Jim Lawrence om the 
night of November 12, 1975? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you hit him or kick him? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you remove any personal property from 
Mr. Lawrence on that night? 
A. No. 
Q. And is this testimony that you've given true to the 
best of your recollection? 
A. Yes. 
JACKSONs Your witness. 
PROSECUTORs Q. Mr. Garnett, where are you employed? 
A. I don't have a job right now. 
Q. Do you have any income? 
A. Yes, I get unemployment checks. 
Q. How much do these checks come to? 
A. $55 a week. 
Q. What is your occupation--what did you do when you 
were employed? 
A. I was a ear mechanic. 
Q. Were you unemployed on November 12 of last year? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And your only income then was unemployment cheeks? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Now, Mr. Garnett, you stated that when James Lawrence 
left the B. & L. Club on the evening of November 12 
last, that you did not follow him out but instead 
stayed in the B. & L. for awhile longer, is that 
right? 
A. Yea. 
Q. And you also testified that when you did leave, you 
went to another ba~ and stayed until about llaJO. 
Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q, Tell me, Mr. Garnett, did you see anyone you knew at 
this seeond·bar'? 
A. No. That's why I didn't stay very long. 
Q. Did you buy any drinks at this second bar? 
A. Yes, one. 
Q, Do you remember, or could you identify, the bartender 
at that second club? 
A. No. It was a woman, but I didn't know her. 
Q. Could that bartender--do you think she would remember 
you? 
A. No. I just bought one drink, and the place was 
~retty crowded that night. She was busy. 
Q. Alright, so you say you went to this second bar, but 
saw no one you knew and no one who would remember 
seeing you there? 
·A. That's right. But I was there. 
Q, OK, Mr. Garnett. You said that when you left the 
second place, you went home. 
A. That's right. 
Q. Tell me, would you say you were drunk that night? 
A. No drunk. Pretty high, but not drunk. 
Q. Are you married? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you live with anyone? 
A. No, I live alone. 




Q. And the police came and arrested you at your home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What were you wearing when you were arrested? 
A. I had not changed clothes to go to bed, so I was 
wearing the same thing I had worn the night before. 
Q. You were wearing the same things you had worn on the 
night of November 12? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the condition of those clothes? 
A. What do you mean? 
Q. Well, were they clean or dirty, or neat or wrinkled, 
or what? 
A. I guess you could say they were dirty and wrinkled. 
t•d worn them since the afternoon before, and 1•d 
slept" in them. 
Q. Were there any stains on them? 
A. No. 
Q. Tell me, did you have any money in your wallet or in 
your pockets when you were arrested? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. How much? 
A. A little over $70. 
Q. Since you•re unemployed, and your only income, you 
have testified, is $55 a week from the Employment 
Commission, how did you happen to have over $70 on 
you when you were arrested? 
A. I like to carry at least $50 or so on me all the time. 
Q. I see. Now, Mr. Garnett, to sum up, you say that 
when you left the B. & L. Club, it was after James 
Lawrence had left, and you went to another bar, 
where you stayed for a little while, and then you 
went home. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You heard the testimony given by Mr. Lawrence, 
didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you testified that you did not see Mr. Lawrence 
again, after he left the B. & L. that night? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Your story is quite different from the story James 
Lawrence told, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Somebody's not te~ling the truth. 
A. That's right. 
PROSECUTORr No further questions. 
JUDGE1 Do you have any re-direct, Mr. Jackson? 
JACKSONs No, Your Honor. 
JUDGE1 Alright, witness is excused. Call your next. 
JACKSON1 Your Honor, we have no further witnesses. The 
Defense rests. 
Judge's Instructions 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jurys 
The Defendant in this case is charged with having com-
mitted the offense of Robbery by Force in this county on or 
about the 12th day of November, 1975, as set forth in the 
Information which has been read to you. 
To this charge the defendant has entered a plea of not 
guilty, which casts upon the State the burden of proving the 
material allegations of the Information to your satisfaction 
beyond a reasonable doubt before you would be justified in 
returning a verdict of guilty. 
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The Information is simply the charge upon wnich the 
defendant is placed upon trial, and sets forth in a formal 
way the offense of which the defendant is accused, and it is 
in and of itself no evidence of the defendant's guilt, and 
you should not allow yourselves to be influenced against the 
defendant by reason of the filing of such an Information. 
The defendant is presumed to be innocent of the crime 
charged against him, and innocent of each and every·material 
element constituting such offense, and this presumption of 
innocence continues until such time as his guilt is shown to 
your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt. And if, upon a 
consideration of all the evidence, facts and circumstances in 
the case, you entertain a reasonable doubt of the guilt of 
the defendant of the crime charged against him, you must give 
him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of not 
guilty. 
The material allegations of the Information ares 
(1) That the defendant, Neal Garnett, while acting alone; 
(2) Did willfully, unlawfully, intentionally, and 
feloniously; 
(3) Make an assault upon James Lawrence by kicking him 
about the head and body and knocking him down onto the ground; 
(4) Did wrongfully take and carry away from the person 
of James Lawrence money and personal property of value belong-
ing to him as reflected by the evidence; 
(5) That the said taking was against his will and was 
accomplished by means of force and violence; and 
(6) That the acts aforesaid occurred in Payne County, 
Oklahoma, on or about the 12th day of November, 1975· 
The Statutes of the State provides 
Robbery is a wrongful taking of personal property in 
the possession of another, from his person or immediate 
presence, and against his will, accomplished by means 
of force or fear. 
~ 
To constitute robbery, the force or fear must be em-
ployed either to obtain or retain possession of the 
property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the 
taking. If employed merely as a means of escape, it 
does not constitute robbery. 
When force is employed in either of the ways just 
above specified, the degree of force employed is 
immaterial. 
When property is taken under the circumstances 
required to constitute robbery, the fact that the 
property was of trifling value does not qualify 
the offense. 
Robbery, when accomplished by the use of force, or 
of putting the person robbed in fear of some 
immediate injury to his person, is robbery in the 
first degree. When accomplished in any other 
manner, it is robbery in the second degree. 
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Should you find from the evidence, under these instruc-
tions, and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, 
Neal Garnett, is guilty of Robbery by Force, as charged in 
the Information, and as defined in these instructions, then 
you shall find the defendant, Neal Garnett, guilty as charged. 
But, if you do not so find, or should you entertain a reason-
able doubt thereof, then in either of said latter events you 
shall find the defendant, Neal Garnett, not guilty. 
You are the judges of the facts, the weight of the evi-
dence, and the credibility of the witnesses. In determining 
such weight or credit you may considers the interest, if 
any, which the witness may have in the result of the trial1 
the relation of the witness to the parties; the bias or 
prejudice, if any has been apparent; the candor, fairness, 
intelligence and demeanor of the witness; the ability of the 
witness to remember and relate past occurrences, means of 
observation, and opportunity of knowing the matters about 
which the witness has testified. From all the facts and 
circumstances appearing in evidence and coming to your obser-
vation during the trial, aided by the knowledge which you each 
possess in common with other persons, you· will reach your 
conclusions. You should not let sympathy, sentiment or pre-
judice enter into your deliberations, but should discharge 
your duties as jurors impartially, conscientiously and faith-
fully under your oaths and return such verdict as the evidence 
warrants when measured by these instruc~ions. 
When you have retired to your jury room, you will select 
one of your number as foreman and enter upon your delibera-
tions, and when you have agreed on a verdict, which must be 
unanimous, you will cause the same to be signed by your 
foreman and return it into court. 
APPENDIX B 
PRIOR RECORD JUDGMENT CERTIFICATE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF PAYNE COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 9 
THB 8rATE OF OKLAHOMA, 




JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
Now, on thia ...l2:th.. day of February 19..1.Q_, the same being a judicial day of said Court, and the time 
duly appointed for judgment in the above entitled cause, and said cause coming on for judgment, and the ~~fendant, 
Neal Garnett being personally present in open Court with al.S 
caurt-appo; nted Attorney, _ __.R~aa.,;ym~ololn1..1.1.td~L.u•'-!M!lla~r....,.t..,in...,_ _____________ ., 
m bavin1 been leplly charged with the offense of--~•Lrt9.c11,grmia... _________________ _ 
-'having been duly informed ol. the nature of the charp and havin1 been duly arraigned ~reon, and having duly and 
JllQllSlyentered his plea of Not Guilty to the crime of A.rso.n:;'--------------
• c:Mrpd in the Information herein after having been duly adviled ol h is riiihts and the effect of such plm; 
aDd it appearing to the Court that the defend.ant ia of the age of lU&bt,en Years; and the defendant 
havinf been asked by the Court whether -he.- has any legal cauae to show why judgment and sentence should not be 
praaa•eed against .h.im....., and _h.!._ stating no sufficient eauae why judgment and sentence should not be ~ 
--.!, and llQDe appearing to the Court, it is !hf! judgment of the Court that sa.id defendant ia guilty of the crime ol 
A.non 
~-~-b-e_ra_t_e~--s-e-t-"i_r_e-t_o_wa_r_e...,,,..o-u~s~e~owned by eomplairitant, resultirig l?l 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED BY THE COURT that the Sheriff of Payne 
County, Oklahoma, transport said defendant to the said State Penitentiary at McAlester, Oklahoma, and that the De-
pm1ment of Corrections do detain the said defendant according to this judgment, sentence and order, and that the 
Oerk al this Court du immediai.ely certify under ihe Seal oi tlie Court. and aeliver co the .Sherill of Payne County, Ok-
labama. two copies of tl1is judgment, sentence and order, one of th<> copies to accompany the body of the said defendant 
llo a.id penitentiary at McAlester, Oklahoma, and to be left therewith at the said penitentiary, said copy to be warrant 
and authority for the imprisonment of the said defendant and the other copy to be warrant and authority of said Sheriff 
fll Payne County, Oklahoma, for the transporution and imprisonment oi the said defendant, as hereinbefore provided; 
aid IM& named copy to be returned to the Clerk of said Court with the proceeding:; thereunder endorsed thereon. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED BY THE COURT THAT at such time as the cJ.,. 
'-!ant herein is released from confinement by the Department of Corrections of the State of Oklahoma, he shall be 
rfleued to the Sheriff of Payne County to be returned :o this Court to either pay or otherwise liquidate the co.;a oi 
.tbia action, all wiU1out prejudice to trusty or other prison rewards. 
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APPENDIX C 
SUMMARY OF JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS AND 
INFORMATION ABOUT SENTENCING 
Your decision as to the defendant's guilt or innocence 
should be based only on the evidence you have heard during 
the trial. He is presumed to be innocent unless and until 
you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty 
of the crime for which he is being tried. You should not let 
prejudice or sympathy enter into your consideration, but 
should discharge your duties faithfully and conscieneiously, 
under your oaths. 
If you find that the defendant is guilty, you will then 
recommend s.entence. By Oklahoma Statute, anyone who is 
found guilty of Robbery by Force is punishable by imprison-
ment for not less than five years nor more than fifty years. 




VERDICT AND SENTENCING FORMS 
lN Tl-l~ _ _...0 ... 1 ... s ... T .... R:.:.I ... CI...._ _____ cou~T or- r?AYNI! COUNTY, S-:-An c:: c:~LAHOMA 
~~ i STATE OF OKTAHOMA VI, Cue No. 75-41207 
NEAL GARNETT r 
----·----------~D~ef~en~da~nti:---J 
VERDICT 
. WE, THE JURY, Empaneled and sworn to cry the issues in the above entitled causC, do upon 
our oaths, find that the defendant, Neal Garnett, is ---------
of Robbery by Force_ as set forth in the Information. 
Foreman -------------
IN THE--""'D.-IS_,T-..R~Ic ... T _____ couRT Of P:AYN~ COUNTY, STATE o~ o:{LAHOMA 
P~ioliC l 
r 
STATE OF OKLAHOMA 




WE, TIIE JURY, Empaneled and sworn to cry the issues in the above entitled cause, do upon 
our oaths, find that the defendant, Neal Garnett, is Guilty of Robbery by Force 
as set forth in the Information, and we further fix and assess his 




EVIDENCE IMPORTANCE INSTRUMENT 
Below is a random listing of nine items of evidence and 
information which were presented in the trial. Please 
indicate which of these items is !!!.2..!! important by placing 
a "l" in the blank beside it. Then select the second most 
important item and place a "2" beside it. Continue in this 
fashion until all items are marked, from "l" (most important) 
to "9" (least important). 
Please mark all items, and use each number only once. 
Amount of money found on the defendant 
when arrested 
Physician's testimony 
Victim's claim that he saw defendant's 
face during the attack 
Amount of alcohol consumed by victim 
and defendant 
Defendant's lack of corroboration for 
his account of his own activities on the 
night of the crime 
Bartender's testimony 
Defendant's prior criminal record 
Absence of stains on defendant's clothes 
when arrested 
Defendant's account of his own activities 




On the following pages, you will be asked to give your 
opinions and observations about certain aspects of the trial 
you have been considering. Some of these questions will ask 





To answer these questions, you will be asked to check one of 
the blanks--the blank which best fits yeur opinion or feeling. 
In answering, it is important that you check only .2!l! blank, 
and that you ~ mark between blanks. 
For example, suppose you were asked the question: "How 






If you are relatively uncertain, but not extremely uncertain, 
that gasohol will become an important alternative, you might 
mark the blank which is marked above. If you are extremely 
certain, you would mark the blank directly under "Very 
Certain." If you are somewhat certain, you would mark the 
fourth blank from the left, and so on. 
You should mark the blank which best fits your feeling or 
opinion. Please remember that it is important that you mark 




Dates Deliberation Room Number 
1. Classification (Circle One)s Fresh. Soph. Jr. Sr. 
2 ·- Sex ( C ire le One) 1 Male Female 
3. How many males are in your jury? ~~­
How many females are in your jury? 
4. What was the initial split when your jury voted the 
first time? ~ guilty; not guilty 
5. What was the final verdict found by your jury? 
6. Was this final verdict the same as, or different from, 
the way you voted on the first ballot? (Circle One) 
Same As Different From 
7. How certain do you feel that the verdict found by your 
jury ~epresents the "truth" in this case? That is, how 






8. How relevant were the judge's instructions in your 






9. To what extent did you consider the defendant's prior 
criminal record as affecting his credibility as a wit-
ness? That is, how relevant was it in deciding whether 






10. To what extent did you consider the defendant's prior 
criminal record as evidence of his guilt in the present 
case? How relevant was it as evidence of his guilt for 





11. How well did the Prosecutor handle this case? How 






12. How capable was the Defense attorney in presenting 





13. How certain are you that the defendant's testimony was 





14. How certain are you that the victim was telling the 






15. How certain are you that the victim was not mistaken 





16. How certain are you that the bartender was telling the 





17. How certain are you that the bartender was not mistaken 







Please indicate whether each item is True or False by 





1. The crime you have been considering occurred just 
outside a bar. (N*) 
2. The victim testi:fied that he had 7 or 8 drinks on 
the night of the crime. (G) 
J. The bartender testified that there were hardly any 
customers at all in the bar the night of the 
crime--he was not at: all busy. (NG) 
4. The victim had never met the de£endant before the 
night the crime took place. (G) 
! F 5. The crime occurred in November of 1975• (N) 




?. Altogether, there were five witnesses who testified 
for the State. (G) 
8. The defendant had been unemployed for about two 
months before the crime occurred. (G) 
9. No objections from either attorney were heard on 
the tape. (N) 
T F 10. Two witnesses testified for the Defense. (N) 
T F 11. The victim paid for all the drinks for both himself 
and the defendant. (G) 
1 F 12. The defendant's income was $55 per week. (G) 
*N=Neutral Item; G=Item indicates Guilty; NG=Item indicates 
Not Guilty 
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T F 13. 
T F 14. 
T F 15. 
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The name of the second bar that the defendant 
went to on the night of the crime was Dorothy's 
Place. (NG) 
The defendant was arrested on the afternoon of 
November lJ. (NG) 
The defendant testified that he went home 
immediately after the victim left him on the 
night of the crime. (NG) 
T F 16. The victim's name was James Lawrence. (N) 
T F 17. The crime occurred in Perkins, Oklahoma. (N) 
T £: 18. 
T ! 19. 
T F 20. 
.! F 21. 
T F 22. 
T F 23. 
.! F 24. 
T F 25. 
Bob Farrell had never met the victim before the 
night of the robbery. (N) 
The defendant stayed in the hospital for five 
days after the crime occurred. (N) 
The victim was certain of his identification of 
his assailant. (G) 
The victim admitted that he was dazed and lying on 
the ground when he saw the defendant's face during 
the robbery. (NG) 
The physician had practiced medicine in Drumright 
since 1969. (N) 
The defendant had about $95 on him when he was 
arrested. (G) 
The defendant stated that he did not change 
clothes after going home on the night of the 
crime. (NG) 
The bartender did not wear glasses during his 
testimony at the trial. (N) 
T F 26. The crime occurred at about 12130 at night. (N) 
T F 27. 
.! F 28. 
T F 29. 
The bartender testified that he had not known the 
victim and defendant before the night of the 
crime. (G) 
The defendant did not have any stains on his 
clothing when he was arrested. (NG) 
The victim and defendant arrived at the bar 
together. (N) 
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T F 30. The Defense attorney made his opening statement 
immediately after the Prosecutor had finished his 
opening statement. (N) 
! F 31. The victim testified that the defendant was 
immediately behind him when he was leaving the 
bar. (G) 
! F 32. The victim assumed that the defendant did not have 
money to pay for his own drinks; the defendant had 
not told him so. (NG) 
! F 33. The hospital where the victim was taken was 
located in Drumright, Oklahoma. (N) 
T F 34. The reason your jury was a 6-person jury, not a 
12-person jury, was because the death penalty was 
not at issue in this case. (N) 
T ! 35. The defendant stated that he remained in the 
B. & L. Club for about one hour after the victim 
left, then went to a second bar. (NG) 
APPENDIX H 
VERBAL INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS 
PRESENTED DURING EXPERIMENTAL 
SESSIONS 
Orientation Information 
Thank you all for appearing today to fulfill the 
obligation you contracted when you agreed to sign up for 
this study. The research you are participating in is a 
jury study which involves an important and meaningful 
research question. The results of this study may have 
direct application in the criminal justice system in 
Oklahoma, so we hope you will take your role as jurors 
seriously. 
My role is that of Officer of the Court, and at various 
times during this session I will give information and in-
structions which you are to consider as if they came from 
the Judge himself. 
As a duly designated Officer of this, the Ninth 
Judicial District, which includes both Logan and Payne 
Counties, I wish to thank you for fulfilling the summons 
which notified you to appear as a prospective juror. 
Jury service is both a privilege and a responsibility. 
Exceptions to jury duty are infrequent. They are given for 
the infirm, care of minor children, or other hardship cases. 
Do any t!l'f you wish at this time to petitition this Court for 
relief of duty as a juror? (Pause) 
Since this criminal ease does not involve the d.eath 
penalty, juries of six members will be used. Three juries 
have been randomly formed, and alternates, who will serve 
in ease of illness of a juror, are present. If no juror 
becomes ill, the alternates will remain in this room for 




Shortly, you will be examined to determine your fitness 
to serve as a fair and impartial juror in this criminal case. 
As an Officer of this Court, I will ask you a series of 
questions during the voir dire. Voir dire is a Latin term 
which means "to speak the truth." 
Now, before we begin the voir dire, I will ask each of 
you to state your name, residence, and college major. 
(Pause for this information.) 
We have in the legal philosophy upon which our justice 
system is based, the presumption of innocence. This pre-
sumption stays with the defendant throughout the trial until 
that point at which you are convinced, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that he is guilty. Do you have any quarrel with this 
philosophy? (Pause) 
Do you believe that the burden of proof should be on 
the State to convince you, beyond reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment? (Pause) 
If you had to vote right now, how would you vote? 
(Ask two jurors directly, making the point that, if they 
had to vote now, they would have to vote "not guilty," 
since no evidence has yet been presented.) 
Do you promise not to make up your mind regarding guilt 
or innocence until you have heard all the evidence? (Pause) 
Do you promise not to allow the personalities of either the 
Prosecutor or the Defense Attorney influence your decision? 
(Pause) Do you have any fixed opinion at this time regarding 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant, Mr. Neal Garnett? 
(Pause) 
Alright, now we will proceed with a more specific 
voir dire. 
1. Have any of you ever served on a jury before? (How long 
ago?) 
2. Do you know the defendant in this case, Neal Garnett? 
J. Do you know the victim, James Lawrence? 
4. Do you have any relatives or close friends who are law 
enforcement officers? (What is the relationship? How 
close are you? Etc.) 
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5. Have you ever been the victim of a robbery? (How long 
ago? Was physical force used during the robbery? Etc.) 
6. Do you know anyone who is an Officer or employee of the 
Court? (What is the relationship? How well do you 
know them? How close are you to them? Etc.) 
7. Do you know anyone who has been tried or convicted of a 
felony? (How long ago? Was it a friend? Etc.) 
8. Have you ever been a witness in a criminal action? 
(When? Did you testify for the Prosecution or the 
Defense? How was the case resolved?) 
9. Is there any reason why you cannot give the evidence in 
this ease a fair hearing? 
10. Is there any reason why you cannot give the State of 
Oklahoma and the Defendant a fair trial? 
(At this point, substitute jurors witl\ alternates, if 
necessary.) 
Now that we h.ave formed permanent juries, you will see 
the trial. 
Introduction .Q! Prior Record 
{After stopping videotape at beginning of Defendant's cross-
examination, hand out judgment certificates and says) 
Please look over this legal document for a moment. 
(Wait. 30 seconds. ) 
You will notice that this document is a judgment certi-
ficate attesting to the fact that the defendant, Neal-
Garnett, was previously convicted of the crime of (Crime) 
in that (Read description of crime) • On that occasion, 
he was sentenced to prison, but part of the sentence was 
suspended by the Judge. 
This information is being prov,ided to you in compliance 
with Federal rules of evidence, which state that, if a 
defendant takes the stand in his own defense, prior convic-
tions for felonies or crimes of moral turpitude may be intro-
duced during cross-examination in order to affect the 
defendant's credibility as a witness. This means that you, 
as jurors, are allowed to be informed of his prior criminal 
record, and to consider that record while you are hearing 
his testimony and deliberating for this present trial. 
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You may consider this information in making a judgment 
of the defendant's credibility as a witness, but not as evi-
dence of guilt for the present crime. Do you understand the 
proper use of this information? (Pause) 
Now we will continue with the trial. (Finish playing 
tape.) 
Closing Information 
(Give out Summary of Judge's Instructions and Information 
About Sentencing sheet.) 
This is a short summary statement of the judge's 
instructions which you have heard, and includes information 
about sentencing. Let me read the final paragraph, which 
relates to sentencing. (Read final paragraph.) 
Now that you have heard the evidence and judge's instruc-
tions in this case, please go into the room we have designated 
for your deliberations. In the deliberation room, you will 
find individual ballot pads and pencils. · Please use these 
materials for your individual voting. When you have reached 
a unanimous verdict, please record it on the verdict form 
provided. 
If you find the defendant not guilty, please open the 
door to the deliberation room so that we will know you are 
finished. If you find the defendant guilty, you will then 
decide on his punishment, within the statutory limits. Please 
record this decision on the form provided for recommendation 
of punishment, which is the second sheet, attached to the 
verdict form. Once this is done, you may open the door so 
that we will know that you are finished. Please do not throw 
away or destroy any materials you use during your deliberation. 
Are there any questions? 
APPENDIX I 
GROUP DATA 
Grp Males/ Independent 
Nwa P'e111 Variables De~endent Variables 
Sever Nature initial Verdlct Del Time Sentence Del Tlile 
Vote Verdict Sentence 
(G/NG) 
1 'J/'J Low Prop. 4/2 NG 15 min. 
2 1/5 Low Prop. 4/2 NG 14 min. 
J 5/1 Low Prop. J/J l'fG 22 min. ,. J/J Low Prop. 4/2 NG 24 min. 
5 4/2 Low Prop. 6/0 G 18 min. 5 yrs. 7 min. 
6 2/4 Low Prop. 0/6 NG 18 min. 
7 4/2 Low Per. 0/6 NG 12 min. 
8 2/4 Low Per. 6/0 G 15 min. 20 yrs. 5 min. 
9 1/5 Low Per. 4/2 G 29 min. 5 yrs. 1 min. 
10 2/4 Low Per. 0/6 NG 20 min. 
11 5/1 Low Per. 2/4 NG 5) min. 
12 2/4 Low Per, 5/1 G 14 min. 5 yrs. 2 min. 
l'J J/J High Prop. J/J NG 2) min. 
l• 4/2 High Prop. 6/0 G 6 min. 25 yrs. 4 min. 
15 J/'J High Prop. 'J/) NG 28 111in. 
16 1/5 High Prop. 4/2 G 27 11in. 5 yrs. 2 min. 
17 2/11- High Prop. 2/4 MG 2• •in· 
18 2/4 Jfigb Prop. J/J JIQ 15 •in· 
1«1 l/.S Higlt Per. -.;z NG 22 11in. 
20 1/5 High Per. 4/2 G 8 min. 5 yrs. 1 min. 
21 4/2 High Per. 5/1 G 21 min. JO yrs. ) min. 
22 J/'J High Per. 4/2 G 26 min. 15 yrs. ) min. 
2) 2/11- High Per. 6/0 G 6 •in· 18 yn. 2 •in. 
2• 4/2 High Per. v2 JIQ 89 •in· 
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Grp JllalH/ Independent 
De~endent Variables Num· Fe111 Variables 
Del TiiRe Sever Nature Inltta! Verdict Del Time Sentence 
Vote Verdict Sent.ence 
(G/NG) 
25 2/4 Control Group .5/1 NG 18 11in. 
26 4/2 Control Group 6/0 G 8 min. 5 yrs. 2 min. 
27 )/J Control Group 1/5 NG 27 min. 
28 1/.5 Control Group 2/4 NG 5 min. 
29 1/5 Control Group 4/2 lfG J4 min. 
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APPENDIX K 
ANALYSES FOR ALTERNATES 
Relevance S!f Prior Record in Determining Guilt 
Source D.F. Sum of F-Value PR> F 
Squares 
Model a 
Severity 1 5.66 .84 NS 
Nature l • 53 .oa NS 
Severity X Nature 1 26.74 3.97 * 
Error 11 74.oo 
* :e <. 07 
(Ms for low~~:everity .= 3.o_and 4 .. o for crime/property and 
crime/person, respectively1 Ms for high-severity = 9.0 and 
2.0 for crime/property and crime/person, respectively) 
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Certainty ~ Victim !!!,. Not Mistaken 
Source D.F. Sum of F-Value PR >F 
Squares 
Model a 
Severity 1 8.33 2.70 
Nature 1 19.20 6.21 
Severity X Nature 1 12.07 3.90 
Error 11 34.00 
* :e. < •OJ 
{Ms = 5.0 and 7.4 for crime/property and crime/person, 
respectively) 




(Ms for low-severity = 4.o and 7.3 for crime/property and 
crime/person, respectively; Ms for high-severity = 9.0 and 
a.o for crime/property and crime/person, respectively) 
Phu ic ian • s 'r"e-stimonr· _ . ·~---
Source D.F. Sum of F-Value 
Squares 
Model a 
Severity 1 28.81 7.33 
Nature 1 5.63 1.43 
Severity X Nature 1 6.07 1.54 
Error 11 43.73 
*}l < • 02 






Defendant's Lack of Corroboration 
Source D.F. Sum of F-Value PR> F 
Squares 
Models 
Severity 1 .064 .02 NS 
Nature 1 • 83J .31 NS 
Severity X Nature 1 24.79; 9.20 * 
Error 11 29.639 
* J? < • 01 
(!s for low-severity= 4.3 and 4.9 for crime/property and 
crime/person, respe.ctively; Ms for high-severity = 8. O and 
l.O for crime/property and crime/person, respectively) 
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